Farmers’ motivation for participating in inter-organizational relationships in Ghana by Adaku, Abigail Ampomah
  
Farmers’ motivation for participating in inter-organizational relationships in Ghana 
 
 
by 
 
 
Abigail Ampomah Adaku 
 
 
 
B.S., University of Ghana, 2008 
M.S., University of Bonn, 2012 
 
 
 
AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree 
 
 
 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
Department of Agricultural Economics 
College of Agriculture 
 
 
 
KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY 
Manhattan, Kansas 
 
 
2020 
  
Abstract 
Interests in inter-organizational relationships in the Ghanaian agri-food sector has been stimulated 
in recent years by policies seeking to reduce farmers' market risks while improving processors' 
access to required agricultural products. The decision of how to sell farm produce is an economic 
imperative for the farmer. The coexistence of spot markets and relationships suggests therefore 
that farmers must be having some gains from them. This study sought to provide an understanding 
of the factors that motivate farmers to participate in inter-organizational relationships and the 
hierarchy of such relationships in terms of incremental revenue. It was based on the hypothesis 
that reducing transaction costs increases the likelihood of farmers' participation and also that 
farmers who produce perishable crops are more likely to participate. Primary data were collected 
from 354 farmers producing various crops in Ghana. The study found that 55% of farmers use spot 
markets while about 45% were involved in formal relationships with their buyers. Nearly two-
thirds of these participating farmers had direct relationships with their customers, while the 
remaining third engaged through their farmer association or collective. Product quality was the 
focus of most of the relationships, with price and quantity being lower motivators for formal 
relationships. Although the relationships were all formal, in the sense that both parties were 
cognizant of the terms of engagement, it was discovered that the majority were governed by 
informal arrangements.  
Transaction costs were defined as information availability, price, and sales certainty.  The results 
showed that increasing information availability, price certainty, and sales certainty increased the 
likelihood of farmers' engaging in formal relationships with buyers. Because fruits are highly 
perishable, getting selling agreements in place reduces fruit farmers’ risks.  Therefore, fruit farmers 
are more likely to participate in formal relationships.  On the other hand, grains, such as maize and 
  
legumes, have long shelf lives, and therefore, farmers of these commodities have less motivation 
to participate in formal relationships. The results showed that the odds ratio of fruit farmers relative 
to non-fruit farmers choosing to participate in relationships was 4.416 times higher at the 1% 
significance level.  
The incremental revenues indicated that maize farmers were better off developing their 
relationships directly with the buyer however, the choice of the focus area and the governance 
mechanism made no difference. Cassava farmers were also better off developing their relationships 
directly with the buyer, focusing on price-quality or price only specifications and using formal 
agreements to govern their relationships. For cocoa farmers, any method they used to develop and 
govern their relationships made no difference in terms of incremental revenue, however, they were 
better off focusing their relationship on price-quality or price only specifications.  
This study’s results suggest that policy initiatives to support relationships between farmers and 
buyers must focus on promoting transparency and ascertaining sales and prices of participating 
farmers. It must also be focused particularly on farmers of perishable commodities like fruits. This 
study has provided the understanding that information availability, price, and sales certainty, as 
well as the perishable nature of commodities, motivate farmers to participate in formal 
relationships. These policy initiatives, should, therefore, enhance participation and the gains of 
farmers in inter-organizational relationships. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 1.1. Background 
Inter-organizational relationships refer to the way firms connect to achieve their individual 
or mutual objectives. When the participating firms are at different stages in the supply chain, the 
relationship may be described as a vertical relationship. When the participating firms are at the 
same stage in the supply chain, then the relationship is described as a horizontal relationship. Firms 
may participate in both vertical and horizontal relationships at the same time. Often, horizontal 
relationships, such as farmer cooperatives and other farmer-based organizations, are formed to 
provide farmers the critical mass to engage downstream or upstream in their supply chain. Vertical 
relationships are often formed to reduce embedded and inherent transaction costs in the market 
place that are perceived to disadvantage their participants.  
The decision of how to sell farm produce is an economic imperative for the farmer. Farmers 
sell their products to potential buyers using different methods, from spot market transactions to 
more enduring relationships.  A farmer who chooses to sell by spot market transactions can be 
described as one who completes production decisions; finds a buyer after harvesting and sells the 
farm produce at the prevailing market price. This farmer and the buyer aim to satisfy their self-
interests, hence changing transaction partners can be spontaneous (Amanor-Boadu & Martin, 
1992; Peterson, Wysocki, & Harsh, 2001; Sporleder, 1992). The farmer using this spot market is 
referred to as a non-participant in inter-organizational relationships. Contrariwise, a participant in 
inter-organizational relationships is the farmer who chooses to engage a buyer in a more enduring 
relationship to sell their farm products. Such relationships are associated with the performance of 
specific tasks in exchange for specific benefits that are known before sale transactions occur.  
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Farmers’ relationships can be delineated based on how they are developed, the focus areas 
and the governance mechanism in the relationship (Holmlund & Törnroos, 1997). They may 
develop direct relationships with their buyers, develop their relationships through their farmer-
based organizations, or they may develop their relationships through an agent (an individual or a 
company that acts on behalf of the farmer). Farmers may also focus their relationships on various 
aspects of the farm products or the production process that influence volumes, quality or prices. 
To ensure accountability, some formal or informal agreements may be used to govern the 
relationship. 
 Interests in inter-organizational relationships have been stimulated in Ghana in recent 
years by policies seeking to reduce farmers' market risks while improving processors' access to 
agricultural products meeting desired quality and availability (MoFA, 2007; 2017). They are 
premised on the belief that spot market transactions do not favor farmers given the sector's 
asymmetric information structure. The assumption is that the participatory and negotiated process 
needed for farmers’ relationships could reduce farmers' disadvantage in the sector's asymmetric 
information situation (Wagner, 2015). The risks of asymmetric information are exacerbated by 
power imbalance in the market (Amanor-Boadu et al., 2002). Ghanaian farmers’ average 
landholding is about 4 ha and agri-food produce buyers often demand high volumes of output from 
several hundred hectares. This makes most farmers vulnerable in spot market exchanges, 
supporting the need to enter relationships with produce buyers (Yuh-Wen et al., 2005). 
 Regardless of the potential for relationships to overcome some of the challenges that spot 
markets pose to farmers, there is the recognition that, given the situation, such relationships may 
not be necessary (Macdonald et al., 2004; Mighell & Jones, 1963). Consider farmers producing 
fruits or grains as an example. Fruits are perishable and lose substantial value if sold earlier or 
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later. Suppose the fruit farmer decides to sell by spot market transactions, they stand one of the 
two-possible risks: (1)spending time and effort to search for a buyer while the fruits deteriorate or 
(2) selling them in the freshest state to the first buyer who knows the farmer has no immediate 
alternatives and offers a low price. However, if the fruit farmer decided to rather arrange a 
relationship with the buyer, they could avoid these risks. Grains, on the other hand, are non-
perishable and store well. The farmer who produces grains does not stand the risk of products 
deteriorating while searching for buyers and is not vulnerable to opportunistic buyers since the 
grains can easily be stored. This situation may allow the grain farmer to cope with the uncertainties 
of spot market transactions to his advantage. The central challenge here is developing relationships 
that are appropriate for farmer’s needs. The transaction costs theory creates the avenue and 
possibility for understanding the farmers’ motivation for participating in inter-organizational 
relationships in Ghana and to give a basis for policymaking (Coarse, 1937; Coase, 1988; 
Williamson, 1975). 
Farmers’ relationships, when considered in the light of transaction costs, have the potential 
to trigger different economic implications for both farmers and buyers of the farmers' produce. 
Transactions cost theory, unlike neoclassical economics, recognizes that the cost of economic 
activities is raised by human and transactional factors. The central concepts to the study of 
transaction costs include search costs; the cost of opportunistic behaviors; and the cost of 
preventing opportunistic behaviors. The underlying assumptions which give impetus to these 
transactions’ costs are bounded rationality, information asymmetry, difficulty in measuring 
performance, uncertainty, asset specificity and a smaller number of trading partners. Uncertainty 
in economic activities could impede the rationality of the farmer and also the decisions of the 
farmer can only be in the bounds of the information available to him. The small number of trading 
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partners indicates fewer alternatives for the farmer hence defining a power disparity situation. The 
benefits of economic activity will be improved by reducing these costs (Williamson, 1975; 1985a). 
Human action economics is another theory recruited to explain the farmers' decisions 
regarding inter-organizational relationships. This theory asserts that human action is purposeful 
behavior (Von Mises, 1966). Farmers' decisions are therefore conscious and based on rational 
considerations. A study in Zambia portrays this as it showed how farmers altered their cropping 
patterns in response to changes in the climate patterns for 46years (Amanor-Boadu, 2010). 
Given these theories, the study is premised on the assumption that certain pecuniary factors, 
non-pecuniary factors, farmer's socioeconomic and crop enterprises may be at play in shaping 
farmers' choice of how to sell their farm produce. This research, therefore, seeks to determine the 
motivating factors for farmers' participation in inter-organizational relationships.  
 
 1.2. Problem Statement 
Spot market transactions have been the traditional method for farmers to sell their products 
but in recent years, inter-organizational relationships have become part of the gradual shift to the 
goal of modernized agriculture and a structurally transformed economy in Ghana (MoFA, 2007; 
2015; 2017; NDPC, 2005). How policymakers have understood farmers gain from such 
relationships with buyers has affected how they have addressed it in this paradigm shift. The 
problem confronting this research is that inter-organizational relationships may not be valued by 
every farmer and the typology of relationships may differ among farmers who value inter-
organizational relationships.  By the transaction cost theory of the firm (Williamson, 1975, 1985a), 
it is plausible to argue that the value perceived by firms involved in an inter-organizational 
relationship is greater than the value of not participating. In the same token, those with the option 
5 
to participate and choose not to participate may be perceiving the value emanating from their 
participation to be lower than their participation costs. Understanding the perceptual and other 
factors leading to participation choices can help both firms and public policy decision-makers 
nurture appropriate strategies to achieve private and public economic objectives.  
 
 1.3. Research Question 
An emerging research question from the foregoing research problem is this: What factors 
motivate farmers who participate in inter-organizational relationships and to what is the hierarchy 
of the relationships based on incremental revenue? 
The answer to the research question will provide insights into policies that may be 
implemented to support farmers’ ability to fully exploit these inter-organizational relationships to 
achieve their economic objectives while minimizing the challenges they present.  They would also 
help relationship champions identify potential partners that present the best fit to facilitate the 
achievement of their strategic objectives for their relationships.  
 
 1.4. Research Objectives 
The main objective is to find out what factors motivate farmers to participate in inter-
organizational relationships and the hierarchy of the relationships based on incremental revenue. 
The specific objectives are as follows: 
1. Identify and classify the typologies of inter-organizational relationships in which 
farmers participate to sell their farm products in Ghana 
2. Estimate and compare the net benefits associated with the farmers’ participation in 
inter-organizational relationships in Ghana 
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3. Estimate the hierarchy of the typologies of inter-organizational relationships in terms 
of incremental revenue in Ghana. 
 
 1.5. Overview of Methods 
Objective 1 was achieved by using tables, charts, and percentages to describe the various 
typologies of inter-organizational relationships that exist among the farmers. Objective 2 was 
achieved through the estimation of a binary logit model using primary data collected from farmers 
in Ghana. The binary outcome variable was participation in inter-organizational relationships (1 if 
the farmer participates in relationships and 0 if the farmer sells in the spot market). The 
multinomial logit is also used to explain factors determining how farmers developed their 
relationships. Objective 3 was achieved by estimating the incremental revenue, price premium, 
and proportion of farm products sold in the various typologies of relationships.  
 
 1.6. Dissertation Outline 
This dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the study; it provides 
the background and motivation for the research. It defines the problem that inter-organizational 
relationships may not be valued by every farmer and the typology of such relationships may differ 
among farmers who value inter-organizational relationships. This problem led to the research 
question: what factors motivate farmers to participate in inter-organizational relationships and 
what is the hierarchy of these relationships based on incremental revenue? The overarching 
objective was to find out the factors that motivate farmers to participate in inter-organizational 
relationships and what the hierarchy of the relationships was in terms of incremental revenue 
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 Chapter 2 provides a systematic literature search and review on the theme, what are inter-
organizational relationships and what do they mean for farmers?  In chapter 3, the methodological 
approaches are developed. It includes the theoretical framework and its empirical application, the 
method of data analysis, sampling, study area, and data. Chapter 4 presents the results and 
discussion of the research objectives; identified typologies of inter-organizational relationships 
that exist among farmers; farmers motivating factors for participating in inter-organizational 
relationships; the hierarchy of inter-organizational relationships based on profitability. Chapter 5, 
which is the last, presents the summary, discussion and policy recommendations for enhancing the 
effectiveness of policies.  
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Chapter 2 What are inter-organizational relationships and what do 
they mean for farmers? 
 2.1. Background 
Inter-organizational relationships become an option when markets fail (Fisher & 
Hartmann, 2010; Fisher, 1997; Williamson, 1975). In agriculture, the seasonal nature coupled with 
characteristics of farm products may present uncertainties that make the market less efficient as 
discussed in the previous chapter. The farmer wants to be able to sell his products and at a price, 
he deems fit. Buyers of the farmers’ produce such as processors, wholesalers and trade associations 
want the right product available whenever they are needed. The overall importance of inter-
organizational relationships in overcoming some of the challenges of the spot market is well 
recognized. However, given the coexistence of spot market and farmer-buyer relationships, the 
question of what drives farmers into such relationships arises from the literature. 
The literature review covers the definition of inter-organizational relationships, introduces 
the farm as an organization, and describes the market structure and characteristics of the farmers' 
crop. It also provides a review of empirical research in the area of inter-organizational relationships 
as well as the gaps in the literature. The review finally presents the contribution of this study to 
the literature. 
 
 2.2. Defining inter-organizational relationships 
 
“You can’t create an enduring business by viewing relationships as a bazaar activity – in 
which I try to get the best of you and you of me – or in which you try to pass off as much 
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risk as you can to the other guy. Rather we must view relationships as a coming together 
that allows us to do something… – something that makes the pie bigger and is to your 
advantage and to my advantage”. British Petroleum’s John Browne in (Prokesch, 1997, 
p154) 
                                                    
Relationships have been defined as sustained interactions between actors which is based 
on mutual effort and agreements (Ford, 2003; Holmlund & Törnroos, 1997; Ritter, 2007). 
Relationship in this sense is not a one-time transaction but the transactions that occur over time. 
This also means that each transaction is based on former transactions and the expectation of 
transactions in the times ahead (Pilling, Crosby, & Jackson, 1994). Heide and John (1990) 
conceptualize that the expectations of further transactions between the parties give impetus to the 
characteristic investments often associated with relationships which are referred to as relationship-
specific investment (Pilling et al., 1994).  For they have less to no value outside of the relationship 
for which they were made.   
The fundamental definition of an organization has been shown to include the ingredients 
“elements”, “relations” and a “whole” by Krikorian (1935) in the Journal of Philosophy. He 
defines an organization as “a manifold of elements, each element being distinct in a set of relations 
forming a whole” (Krikorian, 1935). Eighty years down the line, Child (2015), argues that this 
definition – which in his own words is “ all the attributes of a collective body taken as a whole” – 
is a great source of confusion as it makes companies or institutions tantamount to “organizations” 
i.e. with specific character and identity. In his definition of an organization, Child (2015), argues 
that the process of arranging collective effort with people or groups focused on different activities 
to achieve an outcome is organizing and the manifestation of it is organization. Hence he talks of 
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the “ the organization of a specific company”.  Two schools of thought are therefore apparent, 
organization as an entity and organization as a tool. 
Between the times of Krikorian and Child, evidence shows that there is little consensus on 
what organization means. There have been some proponents of the organization as an instrument 
and organization as an entity. Gaus (1937), one of the earlier proponents of the organization as an 
instrument defines the organization as " the arrangement of personnel for facilitating the 
accomplishment of some agreed purpose through the allocation of functions and responsibilities.” 
This direction is followed by others (Bittner, 1965; Selznick, 1948). The view of organizations as 
an entity is supported by Kotler (1972) in his work on the generic concept of marketing and also 
by Fischer and Reynolds (2010). Others, however, present a middle ground more or less (Ulrich, 
1997).  Organization theorists have recognized diverging thoughts and the need for a point of 
synergy (Astley & de Ven, 1983; Gouldner, 1959). The decision of which concept to adopt is, 
however, incumbent on the researcher. This study, therefore, focuses on the organization as an 
independent entity composed of resources that interact with a profit-making objective.  
Inter-organizational relationships may thus be defined as the enduring interactions that 
exist between two or more independent organizations to achieve a mutual objective which also 
meets their independent objectives. The prefix, inter, suggests that there is no such relationship in 
only one organization or should two or more organizations become “one” with regards to 
shareholding or coalescing. Inter-organizational relationships have been recognized to be those 
forms of interactions that lie between the two extremes, the markets, and hierarchies of Williamson 
(1975) thus, they are referred to as hybrids (Chaddad & Rodriguez-Alcalá, 2010; Hobbs & Young, 
2000; Ménard, 2004). Inter-organizational relationships contrast with spot market transactions in 
which organizations seek to achieve selfish objectives. Thus, exchanges are atomistic and current 
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arrangements are immediately terminated once better options show up ( Amanor-Boadu & Martin, 
1992). They also contrast hierarchies or integration which is described as a single firm that takes 
on two or more stages of production and is characterized by internal transfer of resources (ibid, 
1992). 
 
 2.2.1. The farm as an organization 
A farm as a whole is composed of various resources, the farmer as the producer, the land 
and capital he buys or rents and the hired or family labor. The farmer mobilizes these elements to 
institute production aimed at making a profit. This institution that makes up a farm constitutes an 
organization as described in the literature as an entity (Keller & Holmes, 1928; Kotler, 1972; 
Krikorian, 1935). In many cases, there is a recognition that farmers do not realize their farm 
operations as a business and hence less responsive to economic possibilities (Keller & Holmes, 
1928; Tolley, 1936). Farmers may produce crops for sale and consume what they do not sell. They 
may also produce for consumption and sell what they are unable to consume. The Ghana Living 
Standards Survey 6(GLSS), 2012-2013 and population census, (2010) have defined a farmer as 
one who owns or operates a farm for sale or for family consumption. Per this definition, it is 
reported that farmers in Ghana constitute about 51.5% and 45.8% of the population by the GLSS 
6 and population census respectively (GSS, 2012; GSS, 2014). However, in this study, the focus 
is on crop farmers defined as those who produce any crops with the primary intention of 
commercializing them. 
In the farm organization, the farmer has several decisions to make. Three of such decisions 
are discussed.  First, the decision of what crop(s) to produce: this has been known to be influenced 
by the farmers' know-how and capabilities, availability of production factors and the relative 
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demand for the crops (Keller & Holmes, 1928). However, we know from the human action 
literature and some empirical studies that farmers will change their decision when conditions 
change (Amanor-Boadu, 2010; Von Mises, 1966). Second, is the decision of the means, method 
and scale of production: this has to do with whether the farmer wants to produce organic or 
conventional, capital-intensive or labor-intensive; whether he wants to buy or rent land and capital, 
hire labor or use family labor, and even whether to use equity or debt financing as well as what 
size to operate. The decision of the farmer comes with financial obligations for renting or buying 
land and capital, hiring labor and also for buying seeds, planting materials, chemicals, fertilizers, 
packaging, storage and transportation systems. The availability of funds could influence the 
decisions the farmer takes. The third and final which is of interest here is the farmers' relationship 
decisions to secure supplies for production and also to have market outlets for his farm products. 
This study is focused on the latter.   
The farmers' decision on how to sell his products is an important one since his primary aim 
is to sell his farm produce to justify his investments and operations. The farmer may decide to sell 
his farm produce using spot market transactions, which is characterized by atomistic interactions 
and selfish gains with little predictability. Farmers may also decide to arrange a sustained 
interaction with buyers of the farm produce, which is characterized by mutual objectives that align 
with individual objectives. This describes an inter-organizational relationship between the farmer 
and the buyer. Relationships between farmers are arranged before sales transactions occur and are 
therefore capable of influencing the first two decisions of the farmer discussed (Pilling et al., 1994). 
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 2.2.2. The Market structure and characteristics of farmers crops 
Products and their markets come with various characteristics in terms of the nature of the 
products (bulkiness, perishability, functionality) and the trading partners. The Ghanaian market 
for the farmers' grains, root crops, tree nuts, fruits, and vegetables is discussed.    
Grains belong to the family Gramineae. The most grown around the world are rice, maize, 
sorghum, wheat, and millet. Maize and rice are major grains produced in Ghana (MoFA, 2016).  
Dry grains are durable, easily handled, transported and they store well when given the right 
conditions. Hence they are not considered perishable. Maize in Ghana has the dual function of 
food for people and feeds for livestock. It is estimated that 85% of maize produced in Ghana is for 
human consumption and 15% is for animal feeding  (Rondon & Ashitey, 2011).  However, this 
may not be the case in other countries like the USA where maize is produced as a feed grain 
(Capehart & Liefert, 2017). The price of maize depends on the proximity to markets as well as the 
time of the year (Amanor-Boadu, 2011). Maize trade is dominated by many women traders, 
“market queens” who buy from farmers (Angelucci, 2012). Rice serves as food for people and 
constitutes an important staple in the Ghanaian diet. Ghana is a net importer of rice, importing 
more than half of the rice consumed (Ashitey, 2018). Rice is usually sold to private companies, 
aggregators and processors (Abdul-Rahaman & Abdulai, 2019). 
Starchy root and tubers are energy giving food for human consumptions and the residues 
also serve as feed inputs for small ruminants and pigs. Cassava, yam, cocoyams constitutes the 
major root crops produced in Ghana. Root and tubers are not considered to be perishable crops. 
Yam and cocoyam, when harvested at maturity, can be stored for as long as 6-8months depending 
on the variety and quality. Farmers who want to capture high season prices may harvest their yams 
early while other farmers and traders may stockpile mature yams when prices are low. Wholesalers 
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are the typical buyers of yams from farmers (MEDA, 2011). Cassava is a staple food crop in Ghana 
but it is also important for the production of industrial starch and ethanol (Adjei-Nsiah & Sakyi-
Dawson, 2012). When cassava roots are mature, harvesting can be staggered as required. They 
remain fresh so long as they are not harvested. 
Tree nuts produced in Ghana include Cocoa and cashew. Sun drying of tree nuts after 
harvesting enhances their durability and storage capacity hence they do not easily perish. Cocoa is 
one crop that is produced for its export value. The buying and selling of it are controlled by 
Ghana’s cocoa marketing board, COCOBOD. In selling cocoa to the international market, the 
cocoa marketing company a subdivision of COCOBOD has the sole right to sell. However, when 
it comes to internal buying and selling, although COCOBOD has the produce buying company, it 
gives licenses to several other companies to buy from farmers thus creating some competition. 
Some of these licensed buyers include Kuapa Kokoo, Armajaro, Olam, and Akuafo Adamfo 
(Laven et al., 2017). Cashew is also growing in importance for exports. Cashew is bought from 
farmers by exporters and cashew processing companies. As of 2009, there were about 12 of such 
processors however the majority of cashew are exported compared to local processing (GIZ, 2010) 
Most vegetables in Ghana include tomato, onions, okra, eggplant, carrots, cabbage, and 
peppers. Such crops are highly perishable because of their high moisture content. The same can be 
said about fruit crops which include mango, pineapple, papaya, oranges, watermelon, passion fruit, 
and cantaloupe. Large vegetable markets are dominated by several wholesalers and retailers who 
are also controlled by “market queens”. Farmers sell to traders at the farm gate, however, they may 
also bring the crops to the market to sell (Asselt, Masias, & Kolavalli, 2018). The fruit market is 
dominated by agro-processors, fresh exporters, wholesalers and traders who buy from farmers. 
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 2.3. Inter-organizational relationships in the agri-food sector 
The literature on inter-organizational relationships is enormous but in the field of the 
Business and Economics of Food and Agriculture, they are relatively scanty. For example a search 
on the Scopus, the most popular database, using the keywords “interorganizational relationships 
yields 2406 articles of which only about 1% covers subjects on agriculture. Two notable works 
summarized the research on relationships in the agri-food sector in the 1990s (G Galizzi & 
Venturini, 1999) and the 2000s (Fisher & Hartmann, 2010) in the USA, UK, Europe, Australia, 
Philipines, and China.  
The first is the work by Venturini & Galizzi (1999) on “vertical relationships and 
coordination in the food system”. This work contains thirty-six papers that examine the economics 
of vertical relationships and coordination, contractual relationships and mechanisms of 
coordination and some case studies. A review of these papers shows that in developed countries, 
the food system’s pattern of operation which traditionally relied on the spot market was gravitating 
towards vertical relationships and coordination. This was the spur for research on vertical 
relationship topics. Regarding the rationale for firms opting for such relationships, one of the 
papers was an empirical study conducted in Germany at the time of the reduction of price 
guarantees for agricultural commodities in the political economy. It showed that securing future 
sales was the most important motive for farmers to sign long-term contracts (Drescher & Maurer, 
1999). Other studies which have examined the rational of relationships in the agri-food sector 
pertains to the livestock industry (de Graaff & de Vlieger, 1999; J E Hobbs, 1995).  Generally, it 
was clear that exploring the rationale underlying these relationships empirically for more diverse 
situations are needed.  
The second notable work was by Fisher & Hartmann (2010) on “Agri-food chain 
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relationships”. It contains seventeen papers on theoretical foundations, empirical evidence, and 
implications and outlook. The gravitation of the agri-food market in advanced countries towards 
more coordinated relationships is even more true in this recent work.  One of the studies conducted 
in Ireland showed that about one in seven cattle farmers sold their finished cattle in the spot market 
while the remaining used some relationship with their main buyer (Henchion & McIntyre, 2010). 
The main focus of the papers, however, was to assess the sustainability of inter-organizational 
relationships. The lessons from this work indicated that the cases where buyers and sellers should 
lean on the spot market or rather using some specific typology of the inter-organizational 
relationship remain unclear in the literature (Chaddad, Fischer, & Hartmann, 2010).  
 In Ghana and Africa at large, most of the work that has been done on inter-organizational 
relationships pertains to the governance referred to as contract farming (Abdul-Rahaman & 
Abdulai, 2019; Bijman, 2008; Deb & Suri, 2013; Dubbert, 2019; Grosh, 1994; Kanburi Bidzakin, 
Fialor, Awunyo-Vitor, & Yahaya, 2019; Lambrecht & Ragasa, 2018; Oya, 2012; Poku, Birner, & 
Gupta, 2018; Porter & Phillips-Howard, 1997). The most prolific of such studies in Ghana include 
those that assess the formal (written) and informal (verbal) contracts (Abdul-Rahaman & Abdulai, 
2019; Poku et al., 2018). Other typologies of farmers’ relationships that pertain to how 
relationships are developed and the focus of such relationships need to be studied.  
In the empirical research of the economic rationale for such contractual relationships, 
farmers' characteristics such as farm income, household income, age, gender, farming experience, 
education, and farm size have been explored. In that regard, a study conducted in Ghana on the 
factors influencing cassava farmers' participation in out-grower schemes found that farmers' 
characteristics were not significant in explaining the farmers' participation. They also found that 
the contract conditions such as whether it was formal or informal, the pricing arrangement, and 
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transportation significantly influence farmers’ participation (Poku et al., 2018). Other Ghanaian 
studies also found only the age was significant in determining 458 rice farmers' participation 
decisions in contractual relationships (Abdul-Rahaman & Abdulai, 2019). However, there exist 
some contrary results in other countries that show that age, gender, farming experience, 
landholding, and organization membership are important in the farmers' decision to participate in 
contract farming (Bellemare, 2012). These results were based on an evaluation of 1200 farmers 
producing 10 different crops in Madagascar. The foregoing indicates that it is not fully clear in the 
literature how farmers' characteristics influence their contractual choice decisions. 
According to the various contributions of the literature, product characteristics is also an 
important factor affecting the relationships farmers use and also their performance (Camanzi, 
Arba, Rota, Zanasi, & Malorgio, 2018; Fisher, 1997; Lajili, Barry, & Sonka, 1995). In this regard, 
Lajili et al. (1995) evaluate the factors influencing vertical coordination decisions where 
perishability one of the main characteristics of agricultural products was introduced as an indicator 
of the presence of transaction costs in spot markets in the agri-food sector. A further interesting 
contribution to the product as a factor was provided by Fisher (1997). He suggests that an effective 
supply chain strategy is based on considerations for the nature of the demand for products; the 
product lifecycle; demand predictability; product variety; and market standards.  
Other studies provide a hint that there are tradeoffs between the spot market and inter-
organizational relationships. For example, Lajili, Barry, and Sonka (1995) in their work based on 
synthesized literature identified spot markets to have disadvantages such as quantity and quality 
uncertainties, volatility in prices, information asymmetry, inefficiencies in cases of perishable 
products. These could be offset by building relationships.  They also identified the advantages of 
spot markets to include little to no switching costs, reduced bargaining cost, and also sellers are 
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the sole claimants of residuals. The opposite was found true in built up relationships. Another 
example is Fisher and Hartmann (2010) who assert that the effectiveness of inter-organizational 
relationships over the competition in the market is dependent on the situation. The dependency on 
the situation is also supported by Oliveira and Lumineau (2019) whose work shows that the nature 
of transactions can affect the outcome of inter-organizational relationships.  
 
 2.4. Assessment of inter-organizational relationships in the agri-food sector 
The study of inter-organizational relationships begins with situating it in a theoretical 
framework in the endeavor to bring an understanding of the factors that are important for their 
existence as well as their outcomes. Agency theory (Utomo, Onggo, & Eldridge, 2018), 
contingency theories and exchange theories (Maypole, 1982), stakeholder, learning and strategic 
choice theory (Barringer & Harrison, 2000) have been used to understand inter-organizational 
relationships. Some of the earlier theories include those of Van De Ven (1976) who developed a 
theory referred to as the “social action system” which is also traceable to the system theorists 
Parsons (1960) and Von Bertalanffy (1972). However, more prominent among the theories stand 
the transaction costs theory and resource-based theory. Chaddad and Rodriguez-Alcalá (2010), in 
their work on inter-organizational relationships in the agri-food system, perceived that the 
resource-based view explains the horizontal relationships and relationships between organizations 
from different industries while vertical relationships are dominated by the transaction cost theory. 
Cropper, Ebers, Huxham, & Ring (2008), provides some review of the origins and chronology of 
the theories for understanding inter-organizational relationships. 
Empirical research in inter-organizational relationships in the agri-food sector has not kept 
pace with the theoretical contributions due to the difficulty in measuring constructs (Galizzi & 
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Venturini, 1999; Kataike & Gellynck, 2018; Oya, 2012). In the estimation of the economic 
rationale and outcomes of inter-organizational relationships, some approaches that have been used 
include the Tobit model. This is used when the dependent variable is censored. Probit and logit 
models have also be used in other empirical studies that try to explain farmers' participation 
decisions. In such cases, participation has been modeled as a binary choice variable (Poku et al., 
2018; Xaba & Masuku, 2012). Others have used multinomial logit where the farmers' choice was 
between more than two methods for selling their outputs (Abdul-Rahaman & Abdulai, 2019; 
Boger, 2001). One issue that pertains to empirical modeling is the measurements of transaction 
costs when they are included. Some have used a ranking based on a Likert scale with some conjoint 
analysis, Hobbs (1995), or factor analysis, Camanzi et al. (2018) or principal component analysis, 
Masakure and Henson (2005). Others have also used a monetary measure based on the observed 
choice of the market (Vakis, Sadoulet, & Janvry, 2003). 
The most commonly used measures of performance in the context of the relationships that 
farmers engage to sell their output include farm income, household income, the proportion of the 
sale, the average price (Abdul-Rahaman & Abdulai, 2019; Alemu, Maertens, Deckers, Bauer, & 
Mathijs, 2016; Camanzi et al., 2018; Hobbs, 1995). Generally, there is a lack of consensus in 
measuring the performance of inter-organizational relationships because of the complexity and 
challenge of being able to link it to the relationship (Provan & Sydow, 2009). This could be 
compounded by the positivist tradition of seeking objectivity and precision in such evaluations 
(Colander, 1992). Provan and Sydow (2009) also perceived that the different theoretical 
perspectives used in understanding inter-organizational relationships is a contributor. However, 
their work which was to present a rationale for the evaluation of inter-organizational relationships 
was based on an assumption that inter-organizational relationships “are the product of purposeful 
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choices by organizational managers, even if these choices are motivated in part by pressures to 
conform”. The purposefulness of the choice is a fundamental construct of human action theory 
(Von Mises, 1966), though this was not recognized in their work. The human action theory has 
hardly ever been used in the study of inter-organizational relationships. This research attempts to 
enhance understanding and evaluation of these relationships using human action economics 
concepts and transaction cost theories.  
 
 2.5. Contribution to the literature 
Given the foregoing gaps in the literature, the primary contribution of this research was to 
provide the rationale for farmers' participation in inter-organizational relationships in Ghana and 
expand the evaluation of outcomes beyond the governance of relationships.  
The existing literature on inter-organizational relationships in the agri-food sector is 
particularly scanty relative to other fields. The development in the literature from the 1990s 
suggested that most needed was the understanding for farmers opting for such relationships as well 
as the cases in which buyers and sellers should lean on the spot market or some type of relationship. 
The Ghanaian studies on inter-organizational relationships have covered mainly the governance, 
contract farming (informal and formal agreements). Although assessing the governance of farmers' 
relationships is meaningful, they may not capture the full picture that will provide insights for 
policies to support farmers' achieve their economic objectives. 
This study, therefore, attempted to illuminate farmers' motivation for participating in inter-
organizational relationships and to evaluate other typologies of relationships beyond the 
governance. The understanding was based on the transaction cost and human action theories. 
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Chapter 3 Methods 
 3.1. Background 
This research attempted to provide an understanding of the factors’ motivating farmers to 
participate in inter-organizational relationships are well as the hierarchy of such relationships in 
terms of incremental revenue. Given that the research objective is situated within the frame of 
transaction cost and human action theories, a mixed-method was an attractive approach because 
of the associated non-pecuniary components. The mixed-method involved collecting and 
analyzing both qualitative and quantitative data hence providing the basis for a complete study 
of the motivators for the farmers' participation in relationships with their downstream partners.  
The literature, however, shows a diversity of approaches that have been used in the context 
of inter-organizational relations: qualitative methods (Mighell & Jones, 1963); quantitative 
(Frank, 1992; Levy, 1985); and mixed methods (Hobbs, 1995). Both quantitative and qualitative 
have weaknesses that can be offset by using a combination of the two. Quantitative methods tend 
to hide the context of the research while the qualitative methods may be subjective and cannot 
be generalized. The superiority of the mixed methods is because it allows both exploration and 
analysis simultaneously. 
The mixed-methods approach was, therefore, followed to collect primary data from farmers 
for this research. The triangulation design, the most common approach to mixing methods, 
Creswell (2014), was of interest here as it allows the confirmation of the factors and motivators 
for farmers’ participation in relationships while controlling for farmer characteristics. The study 
area, survey sampling, data, data collection process, and methods are discussed in this section. 
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 3.2. Study area 
Ghana is a tropical country located in West Africa. It is bordered by Burkina Faso to the 
north, the Ivory Coast to the west, Togo to the east and the Gulf of Guinea and the Atlantic Ocean 
to the south. The coastline is about 550km long (MoFA, 2011). As of 2018, the country’s 
population was estimated to be 29million with about 56.7% being urban population (World Bank 
Group, 2019). The climate is a gradient of wet to dry from the south to the north. The country is 
therefore classified into four agro-ecological zones: rain forest, deciduous forest, transitional 
zone, and northern savanna. Agriculture employs about half of the population and contributes 
20% of GDP (World Bank Group, 2019). Crop production is the dominant sub-sector in 
agriculture and the principal crops produced include, cocoa, cassava, yam, maize, millet, rice, 
papaya, mango, tomatoes, and cashew (MoFA, 2011).  
 
Figure 3.1: Study Location – Ghana – Within the Context of Africa 
 
Source: (Central Intelligence Agency, 2019) 
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 3.3. Survey Sampling 
The questionnaire was tested on a pilot sample of a dozen farmers in Ghana. The snowball 
sampling technique was used to sample and collect data from 354 farmers in Ghana. The 
snowballing was initiated with a base list of 110 farmers provided by two agro-processing firms 
who buy farm products from these farmers. Approximately 90 farmers out of the base list were 
interviewed. Each farmer interviewed was asked to supply the names and contacts of any other 
farmer(s) they knew. These new set of farmers were also interviewed and asked to supply names 
and contacts of other farmers. This process constituted the snowballing approach that was used. 
The process was ended when the farmers being added to the list dwindled and lingered at the 
sample size of 354 farmers. 
 
 3.4. Data 
The data provides comprehensive information on farmers regarding the research subject. 
A structured questionnaire was used to collect primary data from farmers in Ghana. The questions 
were structured as farmers' enterprise profile; participation separation; production options; 
motivating factors, and demographics of farmers. 
Farmers' enterprise profile covered the crops the farmers produce for sale. 37 crops, most 
of which are the main crops produced in Ghana were presented in the questionnaire for farmers to 
select (MoFA, 2016). These crops were fruits, grains, legumes & oilseeds, root crops, tree nuts, 
and vegetables. The enterprise profile also covered the acreages allocated to farmers' selected 
crops. 
Participation separation question was posed to classify farmers as participants or non-
participants in inter-organizational relationships. The general question posed was, “Do you 
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currently participate in any formal relationship with any buyer?” which required a dichotomous 
answer of yes or no. The formal relationship was defined here as those that involved a written 
agreement or agreement in principle to perform specific tasks in exchange for specific benefits that 
were known before sale transactions occurred. Further questions were presented under the 
production options to characterize the relationships that farmers belonged. These questions 
included relationship-specific investments and the information regarding crop quantity, quality 
and price that farmers received from buyers before the sale. Quantitative data were solicited under 
this group with questions about price premium, and proportions of products sold or spoilt. The 
questions were asked respectively as follows, “Suppose the market price is GHS 1.00, how many 
more pesewas do you typically receive when you sell your produce?” and “Suppose you produced 
100units of each of your selected crops, indicate the proportion of each that you were able to sell 
in the last season?”.  
Farmers motivating factors covered the various transactions cost-reducing factors. These 
included questions on price-related factors, quantity-related factors, information-related factors, 
and service-related factors. 
Demographics of farmers included questions for the farmers' farm and off-farm income, 
age, farming experience, formal education, and gender. 
 
 3.5. Data collection 
The data was collected over one month (August 2019) by telephone survey. The telephone 
interview has also been used to collect from farmers in Ireland where face-to-face interviews were 
not possible (Henchion & McIntyre, 2010). In 2018, the mobile cellular subscription was about 
138 per 100 people in Ghana (World Bank, 2019). This showed that generally, every farmer owned 
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a mobile phone in Ghana. The telephone survey was a feasible method because telecommunication 
networks in Ghana did not have any charges for receiving calls at the time the data was collected. 
The data that was needed from the farmers did not require any physical verifications and so a 
telephone survey was as good as a face-to-face survey. The telephone survey used in place of face-
to-face surveys reduced the survey cost by about 60%. 
 Five enumerators were trained for two days and used in the data collection process. The 
base list of 110 farmers was distributed among the enumerators to begin the telephone survey. 
Each farmer was called on their mobile phones, the source of their contacts, purpose, and duration 
of the survey was explained to them. They were then asked if they could take part in the survey 
and if so, arrange a suitable interview date and time. This process ensured respect for the farmers' 
time and farmers were more willing to share information when they fixed their interview times. 
The times recorded for the interviews showed that farmers scheduled their interviews at different 
times during the day from as early as 7 am to as late as 8 pm. After every interview, the farmers 
were asked to supply the names and contacts of other farmers. This allowed us to increase the base 
list of farmers.  
The challenge of the telephone survey laid in the cases when farmers' contacts could not 
be reached (network issues), farmers did not answer their phones, farmers call disconnected mid-
way of an interview and when a farmer’s contact provided by another farmer was incorrect. These 
cases required high effort from the enumerators. The enumerators worked independently and were 
managed remotely. Communication was through telephone calls, emails and WhatsApp messaging 
and they were paid using mobile money. The two-day training was the only physical meeting. To 
motivate the enumerators to put in the high effort, ensure data quality and prevent any moral hazard 
tendencies, certain strategies were put in place. 
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The first strategy was the type and number of enumerators recruited. The enumerators' 
level of education was from BSc to MSc and they also had 2 to 6 years of experience in 
enumeration. Two more enumerators were recruited than was needed to have a buffer supposing 
any enumerator dropped out or any had to be dismissed for any reason. The second strategy was 
the remuneration and logistics for the enumerators. The enumerators were paid 10% higher than 
the maximum wage in the market wage range for enumerators. Each of the enumerators was 
provided a data capturing device (tablet), a registered sim card and airtime but they had to use their 
mobile phones to carry out the telephone interviews. The last strategy was the monitoring and 
punishment systems put in place for the enumerators. The enumerators were managed individually 
rather than as a group to enhance responsiveness and accountability. Each enumerator after 
completing 12 interviews, uploaded the data and submitted a report of the names of the 12 farmers, 
their mobile numbers, the start time of the interview and any comments. The data were cross-
checked for anything missing and some of the farmers were randomly called to ascertain the 
information recorded by the enumerators. The registered sim cards allowed the request for a Sim 
card usage report from the network provider to track and confirm the call activities of enumerators. 
The enumerator was paid when data uploaded was satisfactory, however consecutive 
inconsistencies or missing data could result in dismissal and non-payment. None of the 
enumerators recruited was dismissed however one of the enumerators had a non-payment for two 
interviews which had missing data. 
The data collection process ensured the anonymity and confidentiality of farmers' data by 
separating the names of the farmers from the data. The report the enumerators submitted had the 
names of the farmers and the time each interview was started however the uploaded data did not 
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have any names but captured the interview start and end times for each farmer. The interview start 
time, therefore, served as the identifier of the farmer interviewed. 
 
 3.6. Theoretical framework  
Two notable theories form the foundation for analyzing the farmers’ motivation for 
participating in inter-organizational relationships: The transaction cost theory first conceptualized 
by Ronald Coase (1937) in his seminal paper, “ the nature of firms” and later given a name and 
bounds by Williamson (1975; 1985); and the human action economics (Von Mises, 1966). 
Coase began describing transaction costs by recognizing that regardless that economic 
theory promises efficiencies with the market, much economic activity also exists within integrated 
firms. He ascribed the reasoning that, for this to happen, there must be inefficiencies (costs) present 
in the market which economic agents can get rid of by using the integrated firm. This recognition 
set the stage for the concept of the transaction cost. 
Williamson summarized his seminal work on transactions cost economics in the book, “the 
economic institutions of capitalism”. He defined transaction costs as, “the cost of running the 
economic system” (from Arrow (1969) ). Transactions costs “are to be distinguished from 
production costs, which is the cost category with which neoclassical analysis has been 
preoccupied” (Williamson, 1985a). Williamson identified transaction costs to exist both ex-ante 
and ex-post transactions.  He assumed that in transactions, the human agent has bounded rationality 
hence their rational intentions have limitations. They are also given to opportunism in the presence 
of uncertainty. An essential element in his description of transaction cost is asset specificity, which 
is the investment parties would not make were it not for the specific transaction. An untimely 
termination of asset-specific transactions could sacrifice productive value or incur additional costs. 
28 
Based on these assumptions Williamson defined transaction costs to include search costs, time and 
expense of negotiating, writing and enforcing contracts; the cost of opportunistic behavior such as 
ex-post renegotiations cost (hold-ups); and the cost of preventing such opportunistic behaviors. 
The second theory recruited to analyze farmers’ motivation for participating in inter-
organizational relationships, is the human action economics by von Mises (1966) presented in his 
famous book, “Human action, a treatise on economics”. He asserts that human action is a conscious 
or purposeful behavior and necessarily always rational. This is distinguishable from the 
neoclassical economic theory which assumes that economic actors have specific goals such as 
utility maximization or profit maximation and they are also substantively rational (Mahoney, 
2005). Von Mises explains that human action is always aimed at satisfying the desire of the acting 
man. Satisfaction is based on the individual’s value which is “different for various people and for 
the same people at various times”. Three conditions form the basis for an individual’s decision to 
act: state of apprehension, determined by the individual; the conception of an improved state; and 
the expectation that the purposeful action will improve his apprehensive state. Therefore, by 
human action economics, an individual’s action is always right. 
 
 3.7. Conceptual framework 
This research is focused on understanding the farmers’ motivation for participating in inter-
organizational relationships. As discussed earlier the farmer has the option of selling their products 
in the spot market or selling to buyers with whom they have a formal relationship. We argued that 
transaction costs, coupled with farmers' socioeconomic and crop enterprises may be at play in 
shaping farmers' choice of how to sell their products. A farmers’ decision to participate in a 
relationship with a buyer, from human action economics, is initiated by the realization of an 
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apprehensive state (Von Mises, 1966). Following this realization, the farmer should be able to 
conceive one or more possible solutions that could improve his situation. Finally, the farmer should 
expect that his preferred state would be achieved when he carries out the planned solution. 
Consider, for example, a farmer realizes that he is faced with unpredictable revenues and 
the inability to plan the production of his crops because of price variability and deterioration or 
spoilage of products from delayed sales in the spot market. Suppose he is uneasy about this 
realization and decides to do something about it. Figure 3.2 illustrates the motivating factors and 
the farmers’ decision-making process.  
Figure 3.2: Conceptual Framework for Farmers' Decision to Participate in Relationships 
 
The problem identified by the farmer originates from transaction cost which includes the 
time and effort expended in searching for the buyer. Opportunistic behaviors of buyers and the 
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cost of preventing such behavior are also transaction costs forming the farmers' problem origin. 
For example, the farmer may have to transport his farm products over a considerable distance to 
other markets for the possibility of higher prices. Buyers may however offer lower prices 
depending on the crop characteristics and how much information they have about the farmers’ 
alternatives. If the farmer tries to prevent such opportunistic behaviors by selling locally, he 
forfeits the possibility for higher prices in other markets. The result of these transaction costs 
coupled with the farmers' crop and socioeconomic characteristics is the prevalence of price and 
sales variability. 
When the farmer is faced with prices and sales variability, he may be apprehensive or not. 
Suppose the farmer is apprehensive because he realizes a problem of unpredictable revenues and 
inability to plan production, he would choose to participate in a formal relationship with a buyer. 
This is with the expectation that he would have predictable revenues and be able to plan 
production. Choosing to participate directs the farmer towards deciding on how to develop the 
relationship with the buyer. That is whether directly with the buyer, through the farmer-based 
organization or an agent. ; The farmer may also decide what specification to focus on in the 
relationship (either price, quantity, quality-focused or a combination of any of the three); and 
governance of the relationship. 
Suppose instead that individual farmers are not apprehensive about the market risks (prices 
and quantity sold) confronting them, then they will be less inclined to participate in any formal 
relationships because these relationships, it has been noted, are not “free”, but do have inherent 
transaction costs.  Additionally, the nature of their enterprise units may make these costs higher in 
formal relationships than in atomistic market exchanges.  
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 3.8. Data analysis 
The study was designed with three specific objectives, to identify the typologies of 
relationships that exist among participating farmers;  to understand the motivating factors for the 
farmers' decision to participate in formal relationships; to estimate the hierarchy of the different 
typologies of relationships that farmers use in terms of incremental revenue.  
 3.8.1. To identify the typology of farmers relationships 
The typology in terms of the way farmers develop their relationships with buyers, the focus 
of the relationship and means by which these relationships are governed were identified by asking 
the farmers three (3) specific questions. One of the questions posed was “Please indicate which 
method you used to develop your most profitable relationship for each of crops”, and the options 
were, direct to the buyer, through farmer-based associations and an agent. The second question 
posed was “Please indicate which of the following focus areas apply to each of the relationships 
you have with buyers of each of your selected crops” with the options given as focused on quantity, 
quality, price, or their combinations.  The final question asked was “which is the most common 
governance mechanism used in your relationships”? Eleven (11) options such as verbal 
agreements, written agreement, certifications, delivery bonding, and written contracts were 
provided to farmers. These were later classified as formal and informal agreements. 
The data retrieved from farmers’ responses were analyzed using frequencies and 
percentages to show which farmers and how many farmers belong to the various typologies of 
inter-organizational relationships. 
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 3.8.2. To understand the factors motivating farmers’ participation decision 
To understand the farmers' participation decision, we used the binary logit regression. The 
farmers' decision was treated as a binary choice variable, 𝑃𝑖 ,  with participation as the outcome of 
interest. The question posed to the farmer is: “Do you currently participate in any formal 
relationships with any buyer?”  Farmers’ responses were coded as one (1) if “yes” and zero (0) if 
“no”. Hence the probability, 𝜋𝑖, that a farmer chooses to participate is defined as a function of a 
vector of explanatory variables, 𝑋𝑖, encompassing farmers’ socioeconomic and demographic 
characteristics, crop enterprises and associated transactions costs (Table 3.1) with coefficient 
estimates, β, given as: 
                                                                                  
𝝅𝒊 = 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃(𝑷𝒊 = 𝟏) = 𝑭(𝑿𝒊
′𝜷) =
𝒆𝑿𝒊
′𝜷
𝟏 + 𝒆𝑿𝒊
′𝜷
 (3.1) 
 The underlying assumptions of the binary logit regression are the standard logistic distribution 
and the existence of an unobservable latent response variable, 𝑷𝒊
∗. This latent response variable is 
a continuous random variable that can be any value in the real line. This assumption presupposes 
that the farmers' decision to participate in formal relationships or not, 𝑷𝒊, is a manifest response 
which occurs if and only if  𝑷𝒊
∗ exceeds a certain threshold. To identify the model, we standardize 
𝑷𝒊
∗ to have a threshold of zero and a standard deviation of one.   
Given that the outcome of interest occurs when 𝑷𝒊
∗ exceeds zero, we can write the 
probability, 𝝅𝒊, that a farmer chooses to participate as: 
 𝝅𝒊 = 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃(𝑷𝒊 = 𝟏) = 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃( 𝑷𝒊
∗ > 𝟎) (3.2) 
Suppose now that the farmers’ participation depends on 𝑿𝒊, we model the latent variable as: 
 𝑷𝒊
∗ = 𝑿𝒊
′𝜷 + 𝑼𝒊 (3.3) 
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 where 𝑼𝒊, is a vector of systematic random error terms assumed to have the standard logistic 
distribution with a cumulative distribution function F(u). 𝜷 is the vector of coefficients of 𝑿𝒊, 
which constitutes 7 farmers’ characteristics, 𝑿𝒊(𝟕); 5 crop enterprises, 𝑿𝒊(𝟓); and 17 transactions 
cost variables, 𝑿𝒊(𝟏𝟕); represented as: 
 𝑿𝒊
′𝜷 = {𝑿𝒊
′(𝟕); 𝑿𝒊
′(𝟓); 𝑿𝒊
′(𝟏𝟕)}𝜷 (3.4) 
 Under this model, the probability, 𝝅𝒊, that the farmer chooses to participate is given as: 
 𝝅𝒊 = 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃(𝑷𝒊 = 𝟏|𝑿𝒊) = 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃(𝑷𝒊 > 𝟎) (3.5) 
 𝝅𝒊 = 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃(𝑷𝒊 = 𝟏|𝑿𝒊) = 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃(𝑼𝒊 > − 𝑿𝒊
′𝜷) (3.6) 
 𝝅𝒊 = 𝟏 −  𝑭(− 𝑿𝒊
′𝜷) (3.7) 
    To estimate the relationship in  equation (3.1),  we use a likelihood function L defined as:   
   𝑳 = 𝜫𝒀𝒊=𝟎𝑭(− 𝑿𝒊
′𝜷)𝜫𝒀𝒊=𝟏{𝟏 −  𝑭(− 𝑿𝒊
′𝜷)} (3.8) 
We can then estimate the closed-form expression in equation (3.1) as follows: 
                                                                                   
𝝅𝒊 = 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃(𝑷𝒊 = 𝟏) = 𝑭(𝑿𝒊
′𝜷) =
𝒆𝑿𝒊
′𝜷
𝟏 + 𝒆𝑿𝒊
′𝜷
  
 This probability can be expressed in terms of odds ratio which is the probability of the farmer 
choosing to participate, 𝑷𝒊 = 𝟏, relative to the probability of choosing not to participate, 𝑷𝒊 = 𝟎. 
The odds ratio is given as: 
 𝑷
𝟏 −  𝑷
= 𝒆𝑿𝒊
′𝜷 (3.9) 
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Table 3.1: Variables for the binary logit model 
Categories of 
variables 
Variables Type of variable 
Dependent  Participation  Binary (Yes/No) 
Independent   
Farmers’ 
Characteristics 
Age, education, farming experience, farm & off-farm income,  
Gender, full-time farmer,  
Continuous 
Binary (Yes/No) 
Transactions 
cost 
Assured price (1); Price premium (2); Knowing price ahead of sale (3); 
Opportunity to improve price when market conditions change (4); Decreased 
price variability during the season (5); Guaranteed sale (6); Avoidance of 
spoilage resulting from of delay in sales (7); Matching production to planned 
sale (8); Reduction in overproduction (9); Opportunity to sell all production 
(10); Knowing buyers’ desired product specifications ahead of production 
(11); Knowing the quantity the buyer needed from me (12); Knowing the 
quality the buyer expected from me (13); Knowing the delivery times for my 
product (14); Knowing the delivery location for my products (15); Better 
communication with buyer allows me to better plan (16); On-time payment 
by partner (17) 
Categorical 
Extremely likely (1); Somewhat 
likely (2); Neither likely nor 
unlikely (3); Somewhat unlikely 
(4); Extremely unlikely (5) 
Crop 
Enterprise 
Fruits (1); Grains (2); Roots (3); Tree nuts (4) and Vegetables (5) Binary (Yes/No) 
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The farmers who participate in relationships were asked the following question about the 
transaction cost variables, “To what extent did the following factors motivate you to participate in 
a formal buyer relationship?”. The non-participating farmers were asked the following question, 
“what is the likelihood that the following factors would motivate you to participate in a formal 
buyer relationship?”. The responses were given on a scale of 1 (extremely likely) to 5 (extremely 
unlikely). The principal component analysis (PCA) was used to derive a succinct number of 
variables, principal components, from the 17 transaction cost variables that capture the main 
information given by these variances and correlations or covariances (Jolliffe, 2002).  
The principal components are specific linear combinations of the 17 random variables 
𝓧𝟏, 𝓧𝟐, . . . , 𝓧𝟏𝟕 which depends only on the covariance matrix, ∑. Let the random vector, 𝑿
′ =
[𝓧𝟏, 𝓧𝟐, . . . , 𝓧𝟏𝟕] have the covariance matrix, ∑, with eigenvalues 𝜺𝟏 ≥ 𝜺𝟐 ≥ . . . ≥ 𝜺𝟏𝟕 ≥ 𝟎. 
Consider the linear combinations 
 𝒀𝟏 = 𝓵𝟏
′ 𝑿 = 𝓵𝟏𝟏𝓧𝟏 + 𝓵𝟐𝟏𝓧𝟐+. . . +𝓵𝟏𝟕𝟏𝓧𝟏𝟕  
𝒀𝟐 = 𝓵𝟐
′ 𝑿 = 𝓵𝟏𝟐𝓧𝟏 + 𝓵𝟐𝟐𝓧𝟐+. . . +𝓵𝟏𝟕𝟐𝓧𝟏𝟕  
                                 ⁝                                                      ⁝ 
𝒀𝟏𝟕 = 𝓵𝟏𝟕
′ 𝑿 = 𝓵𝟏𝟏𝟕𝓧𝟏 + 𝓵𝟐𝟏𝟕𝓧𝟐+. . . +𝓵𝟏𝟕𝟏𝟕𝓧𝟏𝟕  
(3.10) 
Then, 
 𝑽𝒂𝒓(𝒀𝒊) = 𝓵𝒊
′∑𝓵𝒊         𝒊 = 𝟏, 𝟐, . . . , 𝟏𝟕 (3.11) 
 𝑪𝒐𝒗(𝒀𝒊, 𝒀𝒌 ) = 𝓵𝒊
′∑𝓵𝒌         𝒊, 𝒌 = 𝟏, 𝟐, . . . , 𝟏𝟕 (3.12) 
The principal components are the uncorrelated linear combinations 𝒀𝟏, 𝒀𝟐, . . . , 𝒀𝟏𝟕 whose 
variances in equation (3.11) are as large as possible. To obtain m number of principal components 
with the largest variances and have more stable estimates, the maximum eigenvalue for inclusion 
was set to unity (Jolliffe, 2002). 
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The principal components were used in the binary logit regression in place of 17 variables 
themselves. Principal components are uncorrelated and hence multicollinearity issues are avoided. 
The value (score) of the principal components for each observation is given by: 
 𝒁 = 𝑿𝑨 (3.13) 
 
where the (i, k)th element of Z is the value (score) of the kth principal component for the ith 
observation, X here is an (n x 17) matrix and A is a (17x17) orthogonal matrix whose kth column 
is the kth eigenvector of 𝑿′𝑿 (assumed to be proportional to the correlation matrix of the 17 
variables). Since A is orthogonal, 𝑿𝒊
′(𝟏𝟕)𝜷 in equation (3.4) can be rewritten as: 
  𝑿𝒊
′(𝟏𝟕)𝑨𝑨′𝜷 = 𝒁𝒊
′(𝒎)Ɣ (3.14) 
where Ɣ = 𝑨′𝜷 and m < 17. Equation (3.4) can, therefore, be rewritten as: 
 𝑿𝒊
′𝜷 = {𝑿𝒊
′(𝟕); 𝑿𝒊
′(𝟓); 𝒁𝒊
′(𝒎)𝑨′}𝜷 (3.15) 
The empirical specification of the binary logit model of the probability of farmers choosing to 
participate (P=1) is given as:  
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑃𝑖 = 1) = 𝛼0 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖
′(7) +  𝛽𝑋𝑖
′(5) +  Ɣ𝑍𝑖
′(𝑚) (3.16) 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑃 = 1) = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑐 + 𝛽4𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑐 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑒𝑛
+ 𝛽6𝑂𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽7𝐹𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝 + 𝛽8𝐹𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐺𝑟𝑛 + 𝛽10𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑁𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝑉𝑒𝑔 + Ɣ𝑖𝑃𝐶
𝑚 + 𝑒 
(3.17) 
Where Age, Educ, Fminc, Offinc, Gen, Occ and Fmexp represents the farmers’ age, educational 
level, farm income, off-farm income, Occupation – full-timer/part-timer, and farming experience. 
The farmers’ crop enterprises are represented by Frt, Grn, Rt, Nt, and Veg which indicates fruits, 
grains, roots, tree nuts, and vegetables. 𝑃𝐶𝑚 represents m number of principal components and the 
regression error term is defined by e. STATA/IC 14.2 was used to determine the estimates of the 
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covariates. The dependent variable in equation (3.17) defines the farmers who participate as P=1, 
and those who do not participate as P=0.  
The multinomial logit regression was used to determine how far the farmers' choice of the 
method of developing their relationship was predicted by the same covariates in the binary logit 
model. The methods farmers used to develop their relationships are treated as the categorical 
variable, 𝒀𝒊, with the alternatives (1) “direct to the buyer” (2) “farmer-based organizations” 
(FBOs) and (3) “other methods”. Let Prob(𝑌𝑖 = j),  be the probabilities for each of the alternatives 
j for farmer i. Then (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009)  
 𝑷𝒊𝒋 = 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃(𝒀𝒊 = 𝒋) = 𝑭𝒋(𝑿𝒊
′𝜷) = 𝑭𝒋(𝑿𝒊
′𝜷𝟏, 𝑿𝒊
′𝜷𝟐, 𝑿𝒊
′𝜷𝟑) (3.18) 
Where 𝑿𝒊
′, denotes the value of the independent variables for farmer i (Table 3.1-with transactions 
cost variables replaced with principal components) and the parameters 𝜷𝒋 differ across alternatives 
and 𝜷 = (𝜷𝟏
′ , 𝜷𝟐
′ , 𝜷𝟑
′ )′. The parameter identification requires a normalization such as 𝜷𝟐 = 𝟎 
because ∑ 𝑷𝒊𝒋𝑗 = 1. The multinomial logit model can be specified as:  
 
𝑷𝒊𝒋 =
𝒆𝑿𝒊
′𝜷𝒋
∑ 𝒆𝑿𝒊
′𝜷𝒌𝟑
𝒌=𝟏
,       𝑗 = 1, 2, 3 (3.19) 
Similar to the binary logit model which compares the odds of choosing between two alternatives, 
in the multinomial logit models, the comparison is to a base category i.e. the alternative that has 
its coefficients normalized to zero (𝜷𝟐 = 𝟎). The probability that a farmer chooses to develop a 
relationship using alternative j given that the outcome can be j or 2 is written as: 
 
𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃(𝒀 = 𝒋|𝒀 = 𝒋 𝒐𝒓 𝟐) =
𝑷𝒋
𝑷𝒋 + 𝑷𝟐
=
𝒆𝑿𝒊
′𝜷𝒋
𝒆𝑿𝒊
′𝜷𝒋 + 𝒆𝑿𝒊
′𝟐
=
𝒆(𝑿𝒊
′𝜷𝒋 − 𝑿𝒊
′𝜷𝟐) 
𝒆(𝑿𝒊
′𝜷𝒋 − 𝑿𝒊
′𝜷𝟐) + 𝟏
=
𝒆(𝑿𝒊
′𝜷𝒋 ) 
𝟏 + 𝒆(𝑿𝒊
′𝜷𝒋 ) 
 
(3.20) 
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However, because 𝜷𝟐 = 𝟎, the relative risk of choosing alternative j relative to alternative 2 can 
be expressed as: 
 
𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐛(𝐘 = 𝐣)
𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐛(𝐘 = 𝟐)
=
𝐞(𝐗𝐢
′𝛃𝐣 ) 
𝟏 + 𝐞(𝐗𝐢
′𝛃𝐣 ) 
𝟏
𝟏 + 𝐞(𝐗𝐢
′𝛃𝐣 ) 
= 𝐞(𝐗𝐢
′𝛃𝐣 )  (3.21) 
Hence 𝒆𝒙𝒑(𝜷𝒓 ) gives the proportionate change in the relative risk when the rth regressor in X for 
farmer i with alternative j changes by 1 unit. 
  
 3.8.3. To estimate the hierarchy of the various typologies of farmers relationships 
with buyers in terms of incremental revenue 
The incremental revenue is defined here as the value of the farmers' sales which is based 
on the percentage of farm products sold and the percentage price premium. Suppose the farmer in 
a relationship sells a proportion of his products, 𝑸𝒊 at a proportion,  𝝅𝒊 above the market price, 𝑷 
, then the revenue from the relationship is given by  
 𝑹𝒓 = 𝑸𝒊 ∗ 𝑷(𝟏 +  𝝅𝒊) (3.22) 
Suppose the farmer rather sells the same proportion of his products, 𝑸𝒊 in the spot market then the 
revenue from the spot market would be: 
 𝑹𝒔 = 𝑸𝒊 ∗ 𝑷 (3.23) 
The incremental revenue is therefore given as: 
 𝑹𝒓  −  𝑹𝒔 = (𝑄𝑖 ∗ 𝑃) + (𝑄𝑖 ∗ 𝑃 ∗ 𝜋𝑖)  −  (𝑄𝑖 ∗ 𝑃) = 𝑸𝒊 ∗ 𝝅𝒊 (3.24) 
Where the market price, P=1 and 𝝅𝒊,  is the price premium, which was obtained by asking the 
farmer the following question, “Suppose the market price is GHS 1.00, how many more pesewas 
do you typically receive under your most profitable buyer relationships for each of your crops?”. 
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𝑸𝒊, is the quantity sold and was obtained by asking the farmer this question: “Suppose you produce 
100 units of each of your selected products.  Please indicate what proportion of your current 
production you sell through your most-profitable marketing relationships”.  This method of 
estimating revenue eliminates the complexities associated with using actual prices. 
 3.9. Research Hypothesis 
The extent of transaction costs influences the choice of relationships.  It is therefore 
hypothesized in this study that reducing transaction costs increases the likelihood of farmers 
participating in relationships with buyers. From equation (3.17) we can state: 
 𝑯𝟎: Ɣ𝒊 = 𝟎 
𝑯𝟏: Ɣ𝒊 > 𝟎 
(3.25) 
It is also hypothesized that farmers are likely to participate in relationships based on the 
perishability of the crop they produce. Fruits and vegetables are highly perishable and therefore 
fruit and vegetables farmers are more likely to participate in relationships. However, Grains are 
dry and less perishable hence grain farmers may be indifferent to participating in relationships. 
Tree nuts are usually dried by farmers before sale therefore the likelihood of tree nut farmers 
participating would be no different from farmers who do not produce tree nuts. Finally, root crops 
are not as perishable as fruits and vegetables, which requires timely harvesting to avoid 
deterioration. Harvesting of root crops can be staggered on a need basis. Therefore root crop 
farmers' participation in relationships would be no different from root crop farmers for that matter. 
From equation (3.17) we can state the hypotheses as: 
 𝑯𝟎: 𝜷𝟖 = 𝟎; 𝜷𝟗 = 𝟎; 𝜷𝟏𝟎 = 𝟎; 𝜷𝟏𝟏 = 𝟎; 𝜷𝟏𝟐 = 𝟎  
𝑯𝟏: 𝜷𝟖 > 𝟎; 𝜷𝒊 ≠ 𝟎; 𝜷𝒊 ≠ 𝟎; 𝜷𝒊 ≠ 𝟎; 𝜷𝒊 > 𝟎 
(3.26) 
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Chapter 4 Results 
 4.1. Overview 
This chapter presents findings that address the research objectives: (1) Identified typologies 
of inter-organizational relationships in which farmers participate to sell their farm products; (2) 
Estimates and comparison of the net benefits associated with the farmers’ participation in inter-
organizational relationships; and (3) the hierarchy of the typologies inter-organizational 
relationships in terms of incremental revenue.  The results begin with the summary statistics of the 
farmers followed by the empirical analysis for each objective.  
 
 4.2. Descriptive Analysis 
This study used primary data collected from farmers in Ghana in August 2019. This section 
provides the relevant summary statistics of the data. The results in Figure 4.1 show that the farmers 
produced the following categories of crops: grains, legumes, and oilseeds (shorted as grains); tree 
nuts; roots; vegetables; and fruits. The respective proportions of farmers producing these crop 
categories were 58%, 57%, 46%, 17%, and 16%. That the sum of these proportions exceeds 100 
percent implies that some farmers selected multiple crop categories as crops they were producing 
(Table 4.1). The table shows that no more than 10% of farmers produced a single crop. Contrarily, 
as high as 32% of farmers produced grains and tree nuts, while 25% produced root crops and tree 
nuts.  This is not surprising since tree nuts are essentially produced for their commercial value, 
while grains and root crops often have dual uses, serving commercial objectives as well as 
household food supply objectives.   
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Figure 4.1: Proportion of Farmers Producing Various Crop Categories (N=354) 
 
 
Table 4.1: Proportion of Farmers Producing Multiple Crops Categories (N=354) 
 
Fruits Grains Roots Tree nuts Vegetables 
Fruits    6% 5% 6% 5% 1% 
Grains     
 
9% 26% 32% 9% 
Roots      
  
5% 25% 8% 
Tree nuts 
   
10% 6% 
Vegetables 
    
3% 
While only 3% of the respondents were involved in four crop categories, 44% of them were 
involved with two crop categories and 33% were involved with only one crop category (Figure 4. 
1).  This distribution is not an accident because multiple crop categories may act as a risk 
management strategy for farm income and also household expense management by the production 
of crops that serve dual purposes of domestic consumption and commercial. For the vegetable 
category, the primary aim of the farmers was not to commercialize them therefore they were 
excluded from further analysis. This study focuses on those whose primary aim was to sell. 
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Figure 4. 1: Distribution of Respondents by Number of Crop Categories In Which They 
Are Involved (N=354) 
 
Table 4.2 shows the distribution of farmers for the specific crops they produced. In the fruit 
category, about a third of the farmers produced mangoes and oranges, lime or lemon. The grains 
category had 57% and 23% of farmers producing maize and rice respectively. The roots category 
was dominated by cassava and plantain farmers with a proportion of 50% and 34% respectively. 
The farmers in the tree nuts category produced two crops, 83% of them produced cocoa and 17% 
produced cashew.  
The results in  
Figure 4.2 show that 45% of the farmers participate in inter-organizational relationships 
while 55% percent do not participate in inter-organizational relationships. Figure 4.3 provides a 
more detailed representation of farmers' participation status emphasizing the specific crops they 
produced. It shows the proportion of farmers participating and not participating, based on the 
observations presented in Table 4.2. Farmers with the highest participation of 100%, 85%, 83%, 
and 50% produced papaya, mango, pineapple, and coconut respectively which belongs to the fruit 
1
33%
2
44%
3
20%
4
3%
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category. This is followed by 42% of cocoa farmers and 28% of cassava farmers who participate 
in inter-organizational relationships. Farmers who produced the grains, rice; beans; and maize had 
14%, 13% and 12% of participants respectively. Following these are the cashew, plantain, 
cocoyam, and orange farmers (which is a mix of tree nut, root and fruit categories) with about 10% 
of participants. It can be observed from these results that the farmers producing the highly 
perishable crops showed high participation in relationships with buyers. 
Table 4.2: Distribution of Farmers Producing Specific Crops (N=354) 
Crop Number of farmers(N) % in 
category  
Percent overall 
Fruits 60   
Coconut 6 10% 1% 
Mangoes 20 33% 3% 
Oranges, lime or lemon 21 35% 3% 
Papaya 7 12% 1% 
Pineapple 6 10% 1% 
Grains, legumes & oilseed 281   
Beans 15 5% 2% 
Groundnuts 14 5% 2% 
Maize 161 57% 21% 
Oil palm 27 10% 3% 
Rice 64 23% 8% 
Roots 235   
Cassava 118 50% 15% 
Cocoyam 10 4% 1% 
Plantain 79 34% 10% 
Yam 28 12% 4% 
Tree nuts 205   
Cashew 34 17% 4% 
Cocoa 171 83% 22% 
Total 781  100% 
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Figure 4.2: Farmers Participation Status In Inter-Organizational Relationships (N=354)  
 
 
Figure 4.3: Farmers’ Participation By Specific Crops (N=781) 
 
 
 Figure 4.4 shows a summary of farmers' participation status in inter-organizational 
relationships by crop categories. The summary indicates that fruit farmers had the highest 
proportion of participants (79%) while the proportion of participating farmers in tree nut, root, and 
grain category was 51%, 49%, 47% respectively. 
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Figure 4.4: Farmers Crop Categories And Participation In Inter-organizational 
Relationships (N=354) 
 
 Results of farmers’ socioeconomic characteristics in Table 4.3 show that the average age 
of farmers who participate in relationships and those who do not participate is about 49 years and 
46 years respectively. The age difference is found to be significant at a 1% level. The average 
years of formal education are approximately 10.1 years for participant farmers and 8.8 years for 
non-participant farmers with a standard deviation of about 4.6 years. This implies that the average 
education of participants is about senior high school level and that of the non-participant is about 
a junior high school level. The education gap is found to be significant at a 1% level. Also, 
participants have significantly higher average years of farming experience, about 20.8 years, 
compared with the non-participants who have 18.7 years.  The average monthly farm income of 
farmers participating in inter-organizational relationships is approximately GHS 4,158 while 
farmers who do not participate have an average income of about GHS 1,259. The difference in 
farm incomes is significant at the 10% level. The off-farm income of participating and non-
participating is not significantly different. The standard deviation of the participants' farm and off-
farm incomes were GHS21,067 and GHS3059 respectively which suggests that some participants 
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earned exceptionally high incomes. These results generally indicate that participants in inter-
organizational relationships are generally older, more educated and have higher farm incomes 
compared to non-participants. 
Table 4.3: Farmers' socioeconomic characteristics (N=354) 
Variable Non-Participants Participants Difference 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Farm income (GHS/month) 1259.24 1736.16 4157.78 21067.77 * 
Off-farm income (GHS/month) 2057.23 2618.87 2470.79 3059.75  
Farming experience (years) 18.70 11.38 20.81 10.54 * 
Age (years) 46.09 11.76 49.62 12.03 *** 
Education (years) 8.81 4.61 10.09 4.55 *** 
Note. * and *** represents significance levels at 10% and 1% respectively 
 
  Figure 4.5 presents the farmers' average farmland by the crop enterprises they produce and 
their participation status in inter-organizational relationships. Fruit farmers who participate in 
relationships produce on average farmland of 51 acres while non-participants produce on average 
farmland of 9 acres. The difference between the average farmlands was significant at 1% level (see 
Table 4.4). The results also show that the grain farmers who are participants, produce on the next 
highest average farmland of 36 acres. However, the grains, roots, and tree nuts participating, and 
non-participating farmers show differences in average farmland ( Figure 4.5) which were not 
statistically significant as shown in Table 4.4. 
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 Figure 4.5: Average Farmland of Farmers by Participation and Crop Category (N=354) 
 
 
Table 4.4: Test of Significance of Differences in the Average Farmlands for Participants 
and Non-Participants by Crop Category (N=354) 
Crop category Coefficient Std. Err. t P>t 
Fruits 42.455*** 12.144 3.500 0.001 
Grains 29.774 20.213 1.470 0.142 
Roots -0.082 0.882 -0.090 0.926 
Tree nuts -1.692 1.164 -1.450 0.148 
 
 Figure 4.6 presents the distribution of gender and full-time farmers by their participation 
in inter-organizational relationships. It shows that 78% of farmers who participate in relationships 
are males and farmers who do not participate also have 78% of them being males. Also, 59% of 
farmers who participate in such relationships identified farming as their full-time occupation and 
50% of non-participants identified the same.  
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Figure 4.6: Distribution of Male and Full-Time Farmers by Participation in Inter-
Organizational Relationships (N=354) 
 
 
 Figure 4.7 shows that male participants, male non-participants, female participants, and 
female non-participants have respective monthly average farm income of about GHS5,080, 
GHS1,451, GHS978, and GHS585. Table 4.5 indicates that the farm income gap between the male 
participants and non-participants is statistically significant at the 10% significance level but the 
female participants and non-participants do not have a statistically significant difference in average 
farm incomes. Male and female non-participants have a significant difference in average farm 
incomes at the 1% significance level. Male and female participants also have a significant 
difference in farm incomes at the 10% significance level, but female participants and male non-
participants do not have a statistically significant difference in average farm incomes. 
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Figure 4.7: Farm Income by Gender and Participation (N=354) 
 
 
 
Table 4.5: Test For Significance of the Difference in Average Farm Income by Gender and 
Participation in Inter-Organizational Relationships (N=354) 
Farmer gender and participation in IOR Coefficient Std. Err. t P>t 
Male non-participant/participant -3629.458* 2147.765 -1.69 0.092 
Female non-participant/participant -393.8146 311.4774 -1.26 0.207 
Female/male non-participant -866.1806*** 180.6476 -4.79 0.000 
Female/male participant -4101.824* 2162.701 -1.9 0.059 
Female participant/male non-participant -472.366 334.8731 -1.41 0.159 
 
 4.3. Identified typologies of farmers relationships 
This objective is focused on identifying and classifying the relationships that farmers 
participate in, with buyers of their crop products. The analysis is focused on that 45% of farmers 
who identified themselves as participants in inter-organizational relationships. Three typologies of 
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inter-organizational relationships were identified from the survey: structure typology; 
specification typology; and governance typology.  
 4.3.1. Structure typology 
Table 4.6 shows the first typology of farmers’ relationship, the structure, constructed based 
on how farmers developed their relationship with the buyers of their crop products. The evidence 
from this research shows that direct relationships with the buyer are the most preferred. As shown 
in the table, 67.5% of the participating farmers surveyed, developed their relationships directly 
with the buyer. Also, 21.8% of the farmers developed their relationships through the farmer-based 
organization (FBO) and 4.4% of the farmers used an agent to develop their relationships with the 
buyer. About 2% of the farmers used a combination of D2B and FBO as well as FBO and Agent 
to develop their relationships. 
Table 4.6: Farmers Method for Developing a Relationship with Buyer (N=160) 
Structure of the relationship Frequency Percent 
Direct to buyer  108 67.5% 
Farmer based organization (FBO) 35 21.8% 
Agent 7 4.4% 
Direct to buyer and FBO 2 1.3% 
FBO and Agent 1 0.6% 
No Response  7 4.4% 
 Table 4.7 shows the description of the farmers who use the three methods to develop their 
relationships. It shows that the characteristics of farmers using direct relationships with buyers are 
significantly different from farmers using FBOs but farmers using agents are no different from 
either of the two except in off-farm incomes and farm size. From the table, direct to buyer 
relationships have 84% of males which is significantly different from the 61% males using the 
FBO method at the 1% level but no different from the 75% males using agents. It also shows that 
younger farmers and farmers who have higher incomes, and more educated tend to develop direct 
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relationships with buyers compared with farmers using FBOs. However, compared with those 
farmers using agents they are no different. The respective average farm sizes of farmers who use 
direct relationships with buyers, FBOs, and Agents, are about 50 acres, 16 acres, and 16 acres. The 
farmers with the 50 acres are significantly different from the other two indicating that farmers with 
smaller farm sizes prefer using FBOs and Agents.  
Regarding the crop enterprises of farmers, 58% and 84% of root crop and tree nut farmers 
use FBOs compared to 39% and 52% who developed direct relationships with buyers respectively. 
The difference in the percentages for tree nuts is significant at the1% level indicating that more 
tree nut farmers preferred to develop relationships through FBOs. Similarly, the difference 
between the percentages of the root crop farmers is significant at the 10% level indicating that 
more root crop farmers preferred to develop their relationships through FBOs. The fruit and grain 
farmers using either of the methods were not statistically different. 
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Table 4.7: Farmers’ Characteristics Relationship Structure Used by Participating Farmers 
Farmers’ 
Characteristics 
Direct to Buyer  
(N = 110) 
FBO  
(N= 38) 
AGENT 
 (N = 8) 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Farm income 
(GHS/mth) 
5,089.23c 25,214.58 927.29c 927.12 1,976.50 1,531.99 
Off-fam income 
(GHS/mth) 
2,764.74a 3,387.70 1,315.76ac 1,233.10 2,714.00 c 1,746.92 
Farming 
experience (Years) 
19.97 10.84 22.76 9.27 24.00 12.71 
Education (years) 10.45c 4.49 9.00c 4.27 10.25 5.42 
Age (years) 48.36c 12.09 52.05c 11.23 52.00 10.31 
Gender (1=Male) 0.84a 0.37 0.61a 0.50 0.75 0.46 
Farm size (Acres) 50.29bB 171.31 16.11b 22.39 16.13B 9.78 
Fruits (1=Yes) 0.25 0.43 0.29 0.46 0.25 0.46 
Roots (1=Yes) 0.39b 0.49 0.58b 0.50 0.50 0.53 
Grains (1=Yes) 0.56 0.50 0.47 0.51 0.38 0.52 
Tree nuts (1=Yes) 0.52a 0.50 0.84a 0.37 0.75 0.46 
Note. a, and c represents the significance of the difference in means at 1% and 10% levels 
respectively. b and B represents the 5% significance levels 
 
 4.3.2. Specification typology 
The second typology of farmers' relationships, the specification, is constructed based on 
the focus areas of the relationship. Figure 4.8 Gives detailed specifications of the farmers' 
arrangements in their relationships with buyers. It shows that farmers’ arrangements are focused 
on quantity, quality, price, and their combinations. The majority of farmers (36%) had a quality 
only arrangement. This is followed by 22% of the farmers who had a combination of quantity, 
quality and price specification in their relationship with their buyers. Also, 19% of farmers had a 
quality and price based specification and 13% had a price only specification with buyers. The 
remaining farmers, 6%, 3%, and 1% had a relationship specification based on quantity and quality; 
quantity and price; and quantity only respectively. The relationship specification typology 
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summarizes that 83% of farmers have a quality focus, 57% have a price focus and 32% have a 
quantity focus.  
Figure 4.8: Focus Areas of Farmers’ Relationships (N=160) 
 
Table 4.8 describes farmers who engage either a quantity focus, quality focus, price focus 
or their combinations in their relationships with the buyers. Farmers in the price-quality-quantity 
based relationships tend to have the highest average farm incomes of about 14,079GHS/month. It 
is significantly higher than the farm incomes of the farmers using other specifications at the 10% 
level except for the price-quality specification (2,894GHS/month) where there is no significant 
difference. On the other hand, farmers with the lowest average farm income of 360GHS/month 
prefer quantity only specifications in their relationship. This income is significantly lower 
compared with the average farm income of farmers using other specifications except for the price-
quantity specifications (401GHS/month) where they are not different. Similarly, the average off-
farm income of 5,554GHS/month of farmers in the price-quality-quantity based relationships tend 
to be significantly higher compared with that of the farmers who use other specifications except 
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for the price-quality specification (2,475GHS/month) where there is no significant difference. 
Also, farmers with the lowest average off-farm income (470GHS/month)  use quantity only 
specification in their relationships with buyers. This average off-farm income is significantly lower 
at 1% and 10% level compared with the average off-farm income of farmers using other 
specifications except for the price-quantity specification where the farmers have about 
759GHS/month of farm income. This implies that farmers with the highest incomes, both farm 
and off-farm prefer price-quality-quantity or price-quality specifications in the relationships with 
their buyers. Also farmers with the lowest incomes, both farm and off-farm prefer quantity only 
or price-quantity specifications in their relationships with their buyers.  
It is worthy of note that the farmers with the price-quality-quantity specification who have 
higher average incomes also have higher average years of education of 11.9 years. This is 
significantly different at 1% and 10% level compared with that of the farmers who use other 
specifications except for the price-quality specification (11.2years) which is no different. Also, the 
farmers with the quantity only specification who have lower average incomes tend to have 
significantly lower average years of education (6 years). However, interestingly the 11.9 years of 
education of the high-income farmers, the 6years education of the low-income farmers, and the 
average years of education of the farmers using other specifications are not statistically different 
from the average years of education of the farmers who use price-quantity specification (6.4years). 
Thus this reflects the generally low level of education of the Ghanaian farmer.  
 It is no coincidence, however, that the farmers with the price-quantity specification who 
have higher average incomes also have higher average farm size (115 acres) because of scale 
economies (Camanzi, Arba, Rota, Zanasi, & Malorgio, 2018b, p. 5). The 115-acre farm of these 
farmers is significantly different at 5% and 10% compared with that of farmers who use other 
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specifications except for the price-quality specification (38 acres) which is no different. Also, the 
farmers with the quantity only specification who have lower average incomes tend to have 
significantly lower average farm size (9 acres) than the farmers with the former specifications but 
no different from the farmers with 10, 12 and 9acres who use other specifications as shown in the 
table. 
The table also shows that the average years of farming experience of farmers who have 
quantity only and price-quantity specifications are 18.5 years and 18.4 years respectively. 
However, these are not statistically different compared with the farmers who use other 
specifications in their relationships. Regarding the farmers' average age, the farmers who use price-
quality specifications are significantly older (54years) compared to those with price only (45years) 
and price-quantity (42years) at the 10% level and the 5% level for price-quality-quantity 
specifications. However, generally, the average age of all the farmers is not statistically different 
from farmers who use a quantity only specification with an average age of 43 years and those who 
use quality-quantity specifications with 51years.  Gender distribution shows a statistical difference 
only between the farmers who use quality only, quality-quantity and price-quality-quantity 
specifications. The percentage of males among farmers who use the quality only specification is 
lower (68%) compared to the males who use the quality-quantity specification (90%) at the 10% 
significance level and the 5% level for those who use price-quality-quantity specification (89%). 
The gender distribution of the farmers in these three specifications is however no different from 
the other four specifications in the table. This implies that in general, the gender distribution of 
farmers with the different focus areas are no different 
 Regarding the crop enterprises of the specification relationships, the percentage of 
fruit farmers using price only (5%), quality only (7%) and quantity (0%) are not significantly 
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different.  They are however significantly lower at 5% and 1% level compared to the percentage 
of farmers using some combination: price-quality (47%); quality-quantity (40%); price-quality-
quantity (46%) except for the price-quantity which is no different from any of the specifications. 
This indicates that specifications that have only one focus compared with those with some 
combination is not a preference for fruit farmers except the price-quantity specification which is 
no different.  
Concerning root crops, 100% of the farmers who use quantity only and price-quantity 
specifications produce root crops. This is higher and significant at 1% and 5% compared to the 
percentage of root crop farmers in other specifications: price only, 38%, price-quality, 53%, 
quality-quantity, 60%, and price-quality-quantity,  43%. However, the percentage of root crop 
farmers in all the specifications are not statistically different from the 35% in quality only 
relationships. Hence the preference may not matter for root crop farmers.  
The percentage of grain farmers using any of the specifications in their relationships are 
not statistically different except between the price only and the price-quality which has 67% and 
43% respectively with a significant difference at 10%. It can, therefore, be inferred that the 
specification does not matter for grain farmers. 
 The specification used by farmers, however, matters for the farmers in the tree nut 
enterprise because the percentage of tree nut farmers in each of the specifications are different at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels. The specifications with a higher percentage of tree nut 
farmers are quantity, quality, and price with 100%, 93% and 80% of farmers respectively. That is 
when compared with the specifications price-quality; price-quantity; and price-quality-quantity 
which have 27%, 40%, and 9% respectively. The 93% and 80% are however not different from 
the farmers who use quality-quantity specification and have 70% producing tree nuts. Therefore, 
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tree nut farmers prefer to use specifications with only one focus area beginning with the quantity 
focus and followed by the quality only, price only or quality-quantity specification. 
 
58 
Table 4.8: Characteristics of farmers in the specification typology of relationships (N=160) 
Farmers  
Characteristics 
Mean of relationship specifications 
Price 
  
Quality 
  
Quantity 
  
Price-
quality 
Price-
quantity 
Quality-
quantity 
Price-qual-
quantity 
N  21 57 2 30 5 10 35 
Farm income 
GHS/mth 
1,002.19aAcC 788.18αϷbℓ 360.00aατ𝛔Ɣ 2,894.43τ𝜂 401.80AϷ𝜂Ƌμ 1,692.20cb𝛔ƋТ 14,079.66CℓƔμТ 
Off-farm income 
GHS/mth 
1,616.95cabA 1,158.61αƋC𝛔Ϸ 470.00aƋρ 
𝛔A 
2,475.60cαρϙϥ 759.80bCϙϸ 2,192.20𝛔ϸԳ 5,554.29AϷϥԳ 
Farm expe-
rience (years) 
17.33cb 21.96c 18.50 24.80bCB 18.40 19.30C 18.51B 
Education 
(years) 
10.05ac 8.88bAbϷ 6.00aAƋ𝛔α 11.17bα 6.40 10.20bƋТ 11.89cϷ𝛔Т 
Age (years) 45.05cC 50.40c 43.00 54.43CТb 41.80Т 50.70 48.14b 
Gender 
(1=Male) 
0.81 0.68cb 0.50 0.77 0.80 0.90c 0.89b 
Farm size 
(Acres) 
10.90bBβ 12.37θϦЪ 9.00aαҍ 38.27bθaA 9.00Aɓϖ 24.70βϦαcϖ 115.17BЪҍcɓ 
Fruits (1=Yes) 0.05abA 0.07αBβƋ 0.00B𝛔Ϧ 0.47aα𝛔 0.40 0.40bβϦ 0.46AƋ 
Roots (1=Yes) 0.38aA 0.35 1.00aαb𝛔 0.53αƋ 1.00AƋBϷ 0.60bB 0.43𝛔Ϸ 
Grains (1=Yes) 0.67c 0.51 0.50 0.43c 0.40 0.60 0.60 
Nuts (1=Yes) 0.81abA 0.93αBβ𝛔 1.00bBƋҍcρ 0.27aαƋϦɓ 0.40βҍ 0.70Ϧcϙ 0.09A𝛔ɓρϙ 
Note. a, A, Ƌ, α, Ϸ, 𝛔, ρ, ϙ, ϸ, Գ represents the 1% significance difference in means, C, ℓ, Ɣ, μ, Т represents the 10% significance difference in 
means  and b, B, Ϧ, ɓ, ҍ, ϖ represents the 5% significance level 
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 4.3.3. Governance typology 
Table 4.9 presents the third typology of farmers’ relationships, the governance, which was 
constructed based on the formality of the agreement between the farmer and the buyer in their 
relationships. It shows that the governance mechanisms used in farmers' relationships were either 
formal or informal agreements. The formal agreement is operationalized here as written and legally 
enforceable agreements which are characterized by low trust between the partners in the 
relationship. The informal agreement is also defined here as agreements in principle which could 
be verbal and characterized by high trust between the partners in the relationship. About 69% of 
farmers identified themselves to have informal agreements with their buyers while 31% identified 
their relationships to be based on formal agreements. 
Table 4.9: Governance mechanisms for farmers relationships with buyers N (160) 
Governance Frequency Percent 
Informal agreement 110 68.8% 
Formal agreement 50 31.3% 
Table 4.10 describes the farmers who use either formal or informal agreements to govern 
their relationships. The results show that the average off-farm income of farmers who use formal 
agreements is about 3537GhS/month and higher and significant at 1% compared to that of farmers 
using informal agreements which is about 1986GHS/month. The table also shows that farmers 
with formal agreements had about 12years and 93acres of education and farm size respectively 
compared with about 9years and 16acres  of the same for farmers using informal agreements. The 
differences are significant at 1% level. This indicates that farmers with higher average years of 
education and higher averages acres of farm size tend to use formal agreements to govern their 
relationships. Also, formal agreements are preferred by male farmers. As shown in the table, 
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formal agreements have 88% male farmers while informal agreements have 73% male farmers. 
The difference is significant at 5% level. 
Regarding the crop enterprises, the difference is significant at 1% level. The respective 
percentages of fruits, grains and tree nuts farmers in formal and informal agreements are 50% and 
15%; 36% and 62%; and 26% and 72%. The difference between the percentage of farmers in 
formal and informal agreements for each of these enterprises is significant at 1% level. These 
differences indicate that fruit farmers had more formal agreements while grain and tree nut farmers 
had more informal agreements. However, there is no difference between the percentage of root 
crop farmers who use formal or informal agreements.  
Table 4.10: Characteristics of farmers in the governance typology (N=160) 
Farmers' 
Characteristics 
Formal agreement Informal agreement Difference 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Farm income (GHS/mth) 9,856.42 3,7059.04 1,567.48 2,897.702 
 
Off-fam inc (GHS/mth) 3,537.80 3,681.42 1,985.78 2,608.516 *** 
Farm experience (Years) 20.52 9.80 20.95 10.901 
 
Education (Years) 12.44 4.79 9.02 4.018 *** 
Age (years) 50.70 13.16 49.13 11.514 
 
Gender (1=Male) 0.88 0.33 0.73 0.447 ** 
farm size (Acres) 93.36 247.98 15.95 18.792 ** 
Fruits (1=Yes) 0.50 0.51 0.15 0.354 *** 
Roots (1=Yes) 0.36 0.48 0.49 0.502  
Grains (1=Yes) 0.36 0.48 0.62 0.488 *** 
Tree nuts (1=Yes) 0.26 0.44 0.72 0.452 *** 
N 110  50   
Note. ***, **, and * represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively 
 4.4. Estimates and comparison of the net benefits associated with the 
farmers’ participation in inter-organizational relationships 
It was argued from the conceptual framework in Figure 3.2 that the farmers' 
socioeconomic, crop enterprises and their motivating factors (which are based on transaction costs) 
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play a role in shaping farmers’ decision to participate in inter-organizational relationships. The 
binary logit regression results are presented here to give an understanding of the determining 
factors for the farmers’ participation choice. For ease of interpretation, these results are presented 
as odds ratios that represent the ratio of the probability of participating over the likelihood of not 
participating.  
The 17 transaction cost variables (Table 3.1) were reduced to three variables using the 
principal component analysis by setting the maximum eigenvalue for inclusion to unity. Table 4.11 
shows the variables and the factor loadings generating orthogonality. These three principal 
components had an orthogonal varimax rho of 0.8258, indicating that they explained about 82.6% 
of the variance in the 17 variables. The overall Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy 
was 0.9043, which is described as “marvelous” (Kaiser, 1974). 
The loadings of 17 transaction cost variables were used to classify the components as follows: 
information availability, sales certainty, and price certainty. Table 4.11 shows that information 
availability loaded the variables, 11-17 while sales certainty loaded 6-10. Finally, price certainty 
loaded variables 1-5. These three variables defined the transaction cost variables used as predictors 
of the farmers’ decision to participate or not participate in inter-organizational relationships. 
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Table 4.11: Principal Component Loadings after Varimax Rotation for Components with 
Minimum Eigenvalues = 1 
 
 
Transaction cost Variable 
 
Mean 
 
S.D. 
Component factors   
Information 
availability 
Sales 
certainty 
Price 
certainty 
1 Assured price  1.87 1.33 -0.03 0.02 0.49 
2 Price premium  1.66 1.09 0.08 -0.26 0.36 
3 Knowing price ahead of sale  1.92 1.30 -0.02 0.00 0.49 
4 Opportunity to improve price 
when market conditions change 
2.10 1.31 0.01 0.02 0.45 
5 Decreased price variability during 
the season  
2.29 1.34 -0.06 0.10 0.39 
6 Guaranteed sale  2.12 1.57 -0.01 0.44 0.02 
7 Avoidance of spoilage resulting 
from of delay in sales  
2.37 1.59 -0.02 0.41 0.05 
8 Matching production to planned 
sale   
2.43 1.51 0.02 0.43 -0.02 
9 Reduction in overproduction  2.67 1.50 0.03 0.40 -0.01 
10 Opportunity to sell all production  2.08 1.58 0.00 0.45 0.00 
11 Knowing buyers’ desired product 
specifications ahead of 
production  
1.89 1.28 0.39 -0.02 0.00 
12 Knowing the quantity, the buyer 
needed from me  
2.24 1.47 0.29 0.12 0.09 
13 Knowing the quality, the buyer 
expected from me  
1.80 1.21 0.41 -0.05 -0.03 
14 Knowing the delivery times for 
my product  
2.12 1.33 0.33 0.03 0.10 
15 Knowing the delivery location for 
my products  
1.99 1.33 0.35 0.03 0.07 
16 Better communication with buyer 
allows me to better plan  
1.61 1.19 0.42 -0.01 -0.05 
17 On-time payment by partner  1.55 1.19 0.43 -0.01 -0.10 
Note. Bold and underlined loadings indicate the transaction cost variables that are loading specific 
component factors. 
  The results of the binary logit regression in Table 4.12 show that a unit increase in 
information availability increases the odds ratio of choosing to participate in relationships by 1.479 
times more than choosing not to participate. This suggests that farmers value unbiased knowledge 
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of product quality, quantities, delivery times and location as well as better communication to 
achieve their economic objectives. Also, a  unit increase in sales certainty increases the odds ratio 
of choosing to participate in relationships by 1.909 times more than choosing not to participate. 
These estimates are statistically significant at 1%. This suggests that farmers value a guaranteed 
sale, avoidance of spoilage resulting from delay of sales, matching production to planned sale, 
reduction in production and every opportunity to sell all products. The table also shows that a unit 
increase in price certainty increases the odds ratio of choosing to participate in relationships by 
1.294 times more than choosing not to participate, and it is statistically significant at 5%. This 
suggests that farmers value an assured price, price premium, knowing price ahead of the sale, 
opportunity to improve the price when market conditions change, and decreased price variability 
during the season. These results imply that the transaction cost variables explain farmers’ decision 
to participate in such relationships with the buyer as hypothesized. 
 The farmers' socioeconomic characteristics are, however, not statistically significant 
overall. For example, the odds ratio of choosing to participate in relationships or not, neither 
increase nor decrease statistically for farmers one year older, more educated or more experienced 
in farming. Also, a farmer being male, full-time or having a unit higher income (farm and off-
farm) neither increases nor decreases the odds ratio of participating as compared to females, part-
time farmers or farmers with a unit lower incomes. These results indicate that factors explaining 
farmers' decision to participate in relationships may not be statistically related to their 
socioeconomic characteristics. 
 The results for the crop categories in the table indicate that the odds ratio of fruit farmers 
choosing to participate in relationships is 4.416 times higher than non-fruit farmers choosing to 
participate. This is statistically significant at 1%. The fruit enterprise increasing farmers' likelihood 
64 
of participating confirms the hypothesis that high perishability of crop products increases the 
likelihood of participation.  The table also shows that the odds ratios of participation for farmers 
who produce grain, root crop, and tree nut are not significantly different from farmers who do not 
produce them. This indicates producing grains, roots or tree nuts neither increases nor decreases 
the odds ratio of choosing to participate compared to the farmers who do not produce them. This 
is in line with the research hypothesis where it was argued that the grains are dry and durable, tree 
nuts are also dried after harvest and roots crops allow for staggered harvesting hence they are 
durable as long as they remain in the soil. They are therefore not perishable and do not show a 
statistical difference compared to those who do not produce them.  
 Table 4.13 presents the multinomial logit regression to determine how far the farmers' 
choice of the method of developing their relationship is predicted by the same covariates in the 
binary logit model. Farmers can choose to develop their relationship directly with the buyer, 
through FBOs or other means (Agents and combinations of direct to the buyer, FBO, and agent). 
Therefore the dependent variable in the model is the categorical variable relationship development 
with the options: other methods (1), direct with the buyer (2), and FBO (3). The multinomial logit 
model does not consider the categories of the dependent variable to be in any logical order as an 
ordered logit regression would do. STATA/IC 14.2 selected the direct with buyer category as the 
base and hence estimated two models: other methods relative to ‘direct with the buyer’; and FBO 
relative to ‘direct with buyer’.  For ease of interpretation, the result is presented as a relative risk 
ratio. In general, a relative risk ratio of less than 1 indicates that the outcome is more likely to be 
in the base group (direct with the buyer). 
65 
Table 4.12: Binary Logit Regression Results for Farmers’ Participation Decision (N=312) 
Odds Ratio Participation 
(1=participant) 
Std. Err. z P>z 
Information availability 1.479*** 0.162 3.580 0.000 
Sales certainty 1.909*** 0.210 5.890 0.000 
Price certainty 1.294** 0.154 2.160 0.030 
Gender (1=male) 0.958 0.428 -0.100 0.924 
Education (yrs.) 1.045 0.040 1.150 0.248 
Farming experience (yrs.) 1.006 0.020 0.300 0.765 
Age (yrs.) 0.995 0.019 -0.240 0.807 
Full time farmer (1=yes) 1.048 0.376 0.130 0.895 
Farm income (GHS) 1.000 0.000 1.560 0.120 
Off-farm income (GHS) 1.000 0.000 -0.210 0.837 
Fruits (1=yes) 4.416*** 2.059 3.190 0.001 
Grains (1=yes) 1.125 0.391 0.340 0.734 
Roots (1=yes) 1.455 0.479 1.140 0.254 
Tree nuts (1=yes) 0.641 0.229 -1.240 0.213 
Intercept 0.597 0.545 -0.560 0.572 
LR chi2(14) 
   
          169.92 
Prob > chi2 
   
0.000 
Note. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels respectively 
FBO relative to ‘direct with the buyer’ 
The results show that sales certainty, price certainty, age, full-time farming, fruit, and root 
enterprises are important in explaining the farmers' decision to develop their relationships through 
FBOs relative to direct with the buyer. When the certainty of the sale of the farmers' product is 
increased by one unit, the relative risk for preferring the use of FBO to direct relationship with the 
buyer would be expected to increase by 1.601 times at the 1% significance level holding other 
factors constant. This indicates that farmers are more likely to develop their relationships through 
FBOs relative to relating directly with buyers when the certainty of selling their products increases. 
Similarly, when the certainty of the prices of the farmers' products increases by one unit, the 
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relative risk for preferring the use of FBO to direct relationship with the buyer would be expected 
to increase by 1.339 times at the 5% significance level holding other factors constant.  
A year increase in the age of farmers increases the relative risk of preferring the use of 
FBOs to direct relationship by 1.074 times at the 5% significance level when other factors are held 
constant. Therefore older farmers are more likely to develop their relationships through FBOs 
relative to direct relationships with the buyer. On the contrary, being a full-time farmer relative to 
part-time farmers decreases the relative risk of preferring the use of FBOs to have direct 
relationships by 0.286 times at the 10% significance level holding other factors constant. This 
indicates that full-time farmers would rather have direct relationships with buyers over FBOs.  
Regarding the crop enterprises, being a fruit farmer relative to non-fruit farmers increases 
the relative risk of preferring the use of FBOs to direct relationships by 13.99 times at the 1% 
significance level holding other factors constant. Similarly, being a root crop farmer relative to 
non-root crop farmers increases the relative risk of preferring the use of FBOs to direct 
relationships by 3.297 times at the 5% significance level holding other factors constant. This 
implies that generally, fruit and root crop farmers prefer to develop their relationship through FBOs 
relative to direct relationships with the buyer.   
Other methods relative to direct to buyer 
Other methods of developing farmers' relationships include agents and combinations of the agent, 
FBO and direct relationship with the buyer. The results show that information availability, price 
certainty, and farmers in the tree nut enterprise are important in explaining the farmers' decision 
to develop their relationships through other methods relative to directly with the buyer. When 
information availability increases by one unit between the farmers and their partners, the relative 
risk for preferring the use of other methods to direct relationship with the buyer would be expected 
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to increase by 1.498 times at the 1% significance level holding other factors constant. Similarly, a 
unit increase in the certainty of the prices of the farmers' product increases the relative risk for 
preferring other methods to direct relationship with the buyer by 1.563 at the 5% significance level 
holding other factors constant. Therefore farmers are more likely to develop their relationships 
using other methods relative to relating directly with the buyer when information availability and 
certainty of prices increase. Farmers in the tree nut enterprise increase the relative risk of choosing 
other methods relative to the direct relationship with the buyer 10.6 times compared to non-tree 
nut farmers. This is significant at the 10% level. Farmers’ characteristics were not significant in 
explaining the choice of other relationships relative to direct relationships. 
Table 4.13: Assessing Participating Farmers Choice of Relationship Structure Using 
Multinomial Logit Regression (N=151) 
Relative risk ratio Other methods Std. Err. FBO Std. Err 
Information availability 1.498*** 0.230 1.162 0.138 
Sales certainty 0.817 0.172 1.601*** 0.242 
Price certainty 1.563** 0.304 1.339** 0.190 
Gender (1=Male) 0.199 0.227 0.606 0.389 
Education (Years) 1.185 0.166 1.053 0.083 
Farming experience (Years) 1.053 0.061 0.974 0.035 
Age (Years) 0.983 0.058 1.074** 0.038 
Full-time farmer (1=Yes) 1.159 1.125 0.286* 0.191 
Farm income (GHS/mth) 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
Off-farm income (GHS/mth) 1.000 0.000 0.999* 0.000 
Fruits (1=Yes) 5.859 6.467 13.990*** 12.433 
Grains (1=Yes) 0.325 0.280 0.912 0.537 
Roots (1=Yes) 2.031 1.739 3.297** 1.853 
Tree nuts (1=Yes) 10.624* 13.708 4.159 3.649 
Constant 0.002** 0.006 0.003*** 0.006 
LR chi2(28)    89.1 
Prob > chi2    0.000 
Note. The dependent variable is the method of relationship development (1) other (2) direct to 
buyer (3) FBO. Reference category: Direct to buyer 
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Table 4.14 presents the multinomial logit regression to determine how the choice of the focus area 
of the farmers' relationships is explained by the same covariates in the binary logit model. Farmers 
may choose to focus their relationships on price, quality, quantity or their combinations. The 
dependent variable in the model is the categorical variable, relationship specification with the 
options: quantity (1), quality (2), price (3), quantity-quality (4), quantity-price (5), quality-price 
(6), quantity-quality-price (7). However, the categories 1 and 5 were omitted because the number 
of farmers who selected those options was below six which may not yield a meaningful 
interpretation. STATA/IC 14.2 selected category 2 (quality specification) as the base and hence 
estimated four models: price specification relative to quality; quantity-quality specification relative 
to quality; quality-price specification relative quality; and the quantity-quality-price specification 
relative to quality. 
 The table shows that the farmers’ choice of a price specification relative to quality 
specification can be explained by price certainty and the farmer being a grain producer. When the 
certainty of the farmers' product prices increases by one unit, the relative risk of the farmer 
choosing a price-focused relationship relative to quality-focused one decreases by 0.209 times. 
This is significant at a 1% level indicating that farmers are more likely to focus their relationships 
on quality specifications their price certainty increases.  Also, a farmer producing grains relative 
to not producing grains increases the relative risk of choosing price focus over quality focus by 
14.981 times which is significant at 1%. Hence grain farmers are more likely to choose price 
specifications. 
 Quantity-quality specifications relative to quality specifications are explained by 
information availability, sales certainty, fruit, and root crop enterprises. Increasing information 
availability by one unit increases the relative risk of farmers focusing their relationships on 
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quantity-quality relative to quality only by 1.493 times.  On the contrary, increasing the certainty 
of farmers selling their products decreases the relative risk of farmers focusing their relationships 
on quantity-quality relative to quality only by 0.536 times. These are significant at 5% indicating 
farmers are more likely to focus their relationships on quantity-quality combinations when 
information availability increases. They are also more likely to focus on quality when sales 
certainty increases. The results also show that farmers who produce fruits or root crops relative to 
those do not produce them, increase the relative risk of focusing relationships on quantity-quality 
relative to quality only by 23.19 times and 14.94 times respectively. This is significant at 5% and 
implies that fruit and root crop farmers prefer quantity-quality focus over quality only. 
 Regarding quality-price relative to quality specifications, the results show the important 
factors explaining them to be information availability, price certainty, the root crop, and tree nut 
enterprises. Increasing information availability by one unit decreases the relative risk of farmers 
focusing on quality-price specification relative to quality only by 0.446 times which is significant 
at 1%.  Similarly, increasing the certainty of the farmers' product prices by one unit decreases the 
relative risk of farmers focusing their relationships on quality-price relative to quality by 0.568 
times which significant at 5%. This implies that farmers are more likely to focus their relationships 
on quality only when information availability and price certainty increases. Also, the farmers who 
produce roots crops relative to non-root crop farmers increase the relative risk of focusing their 
relationships on quality-price over quality only by 6.94 times which is significant at the 5% level. 
Producing tree nuts, however, decreases the relative risk of farmers using quality-price focused 
relationships relative to quality only by 0.035 which is significant at 1%. Hence tree nuts farmers 
are more likely to focus their relationship on quality over quality-price. 
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 The final model, quantity-quality-price relative to the quality specification in the table 
shows the significant explanatory variables to be sales certainty, price certainty, root crops, and 
tree nuts enterprises. It shows that increasing the certainty of sales of the farmers' products by one 
unit decreases the relative risk of focusing on the trio quantity-quality-price relative to quality only 
by 0.232 times which is significant at 1%. Similarly, increasing the price certainty by one unit 
decreases the relative risk of focusing on the trio combination relative to quality only by 0.549 
times which is significant at the 10% level. Root crop farming increases the relative risk of farmers 
focusing on the trio by 20.717 times which is significant at 5% while tree nut farming decreases 
the relative risk of farmers focusing on the trio by 0.010 which is significant at 1% level. Hence 
root crop farmers are more likely to focus on the trio while tree nut farmers are more likely to 
focus on quality. 
 From the results, it is clear that the certainty of the farmers' product prices consistently 
increases the likelihood of farmers focusing on quality relative to other specifications. 
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Table 4.14: Assessing Participating Farmers Choice of Relationship Specification Using Multinomial Logit Regression (N=151) 
Relative risk ratio Price Std. 
Err. 
Quantity-
quality 
Std. Err. Quality-
price 
Std. 
Err. 
Quantity-
quality-price 
Std. Err. 
Information availability 1.072 0.204 1.493** 0.278 0.446*** 0.117 0.753 0.164 
Sales certainty 1.067 0.276 0.536** 0.137 0.844 0.199 0.232*** 0.116 
Price certainty 0.209*** 0.088 1.193 0.277 0.568** 0.142 0.549* 0.171 
Gender (1=Male) 1.515 1.584 1.125 1.620 0.266 0.294 0.697 1.019 
Education (Years) 0.883 0.107 1.187 0.255 1.116 0.137 1.100 0.146 
Farming experience (years) 0.907 0.055 0.933 0.069 1.060 0.062 1.068 0.073 
Age 1.019 0.052 0.996 0.067 0.985 0.052 0.945 0.058 
Full-timer (1=Yes) 1.362 1.368 5.417 6.888 3.618 4.427 5.905 7.800 
Farm income (GHS/mth) 1.000 0.001 1.000 0.001 1.001 0.001 1.001 0.001 
Off-farm income (GHS/mth) 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.001 1.000 0.000 1.001 0.000 
Fruits (1=Yes) 0.204 0.379 23.191** 34.543 1.770 1.821 1.681 2.173 
Grains (1=Yes) 14.981*** 15.639 0.795 0.784 4.912 5.065 0.977 1.189 
Roots (1=Yes) 1.109 1.008 14.944** 17.825 6.941** 6.507 20.717** 24.957 
Tree nuts (1=Yes) 3.943 5.007 3.229 5.554 0.035*** 0.043 0.010*** 0.015 
Constant 0.233 0.591 0.001* 0.004 0.097 0.274 0.080 0.250 
 LR chi2(56) 263.85 
       
 Prob > chi2 0.000 
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 Table 4.15 presents the factors that explain how farmers' relationships are managed. The 
governance of the farmers' relationships is influenced by sales and price certainty, years of 
education, the grain and tree nut enterprises. Increasing the certainty of sale of the farmers' 
products increases the odds ratio of choosing formal agreements relative to choosing informal 
agreements by 1.289 times at the 10% significance level indicating that farmers are more likely to 
choose formal agreements. On the contrary, increasing the certainty of the prices of farmers' 
products decreases the odds ratio of choosing formal agreements relative to choosing informal 
agreements by 0.747 times at the 10% significance level. This indicates that farmers are more 
likely to use informal agreements when they are more certain about prices. Also, a year increase 
in education increases the odds ratio of choosing formal agreements relative to informal 
agreements by 1.118 times. This is not coincidental as more educated farmers may find it easier to 
comprehend the rigor of formal agreements. Regarding the crop enterprises, farmers producing 
grains relative to those who do not produce them decreases the odds ratio of using formal 
agreements relative to informal agreements by 0.393 times at the 10% significance level. Similarly, 
farmers who produce tree nuts decreases the odds ratio of using formal agreements relative to 
informal agreements by 0.105 times at the 1% significance level. This implies that grains and tree 
nuts farmers are more likely to use informal agreements over formal agreements 
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Table 4.15: Assessing Participating Farmers Choice of Relationship Governance Using 
Binary Logit Regression (N=158) 
Odds Ratio Governance 
(1=formal 
0=informal) 
Std. Err. z P>z 
Information availability 0.885 0.078 -1.39 0.166 
Sales certainty 1.289* 0.173 1.89 0.059 
Price certainty 0.747* 0.113 -1.93 0.054 
Gender (1=Male) 2.054 1.420 1.04 0.298 
Education (Years) 1.118* 0.068 1.83 0.067 
Farming experience (years) 0.991 0.032 -0.26 0.791 
Age (years) 0.994 0.028 -0.22 0.827 
Full-timer (1=Yes) 1.781 1.097 0.94 0.348 
Farm income (GHS/mth) 1.000 0.000 0.76 0.445 
Off-farm income (GHS/mth) 1.000 0.000 0.54 0.593 
Fruits (1=Yes) 1.919 1.158 1.08 0.280 
Grains (1=Yes) 0.393* 0.219 -1.67 0.094 
Roots (1=Yes) 0.968 0.503 -0.06 0.951 
Tree nuts (1=Yes) 0.105*** 0.066 -3.57 0.000 
Constant 0.261 0.376 -0.93 0.351 
 LR chi2(14) 77.510 
   
 Prob > chi2 0.000 
   
 
 
 4.5. Estimate the hierarchy of inter-organizational relationships in terms of 
Incremental revenue in Ghana 
This section presents the results of the third objective which is focused on estimating which 
relationship structure, specification or governance yields the highest average incremental revenue 
in percentage terms. The average percentage of premium prices and the average percentage of 
products sold are also reported. The premium price percentage is the proportion of the price that 
accrues on top of an assumed market price of GHS1.00 and the percentage of products sold is the 
proportion of a hypothetical benchmark of 100units that was sold. The incremental revenue 
percentage is therefore measured as the product of the price premium percentage and the product 
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percentage sold. The analysis in this section is based on the crop relationships considered to be 
most profitable by participating farmers. Table 4.16 shows that about 59% of participating fruit 
farmers consider the fruit relationship to be their most profitable and mango farmers dominate in 
this category. The table also shows that about 23% of participating grain farmers consider grain 
relationships to be their most profitable and maize farmers dominate. The results also show that 
about 32% and 81% of root crop and tree nut farmers consider the same to be their most profitable. 
Root crop and tree nut relationships are dominated by cassava and cocoa, respectively.  
Table 4.16: Crops Considered to be Most Profitable by Participating Farmers 
Crop Number of farmers(N) 
Total Participants Most profitable Relationship 
Fruits 60 45 (57.8%)26 
Coconut 6 3 2 
Mangoes 20 17 14 
Oranges, lime or lemon 21 13 0 
Papaya 7 7 6 
Pineapple 6 5 4 
Grains, legumes &oilseed 281 117 (23.1%) 27 
Beans 15 6 0 
Groundnuts 14 6 1 
Maize 161 63 19 
Oil palm 27 14 0 
Rice 64 28 7 
Roots 235 100 (32%) 32 
Cassava 118 53 27 
Cocoyam 10 7 0 
Plantain 79 35 5 
Yam 28 5 0 
Tree nuts  205 93 (80.6%) 75 
Cashew 34 6 4 
Cocoa 171 87 71 
Total 781 355 160 
 Table 4.17 presents the percentage incremental revenue resulting from how the farmers 
develop their relationships with their buyers. That is the structure-based typology of farmers’ 
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relationships by the crop categories and by the dominant crop for each crop category in Table 4.18.  
The results in Table 4.17 show that participating farmers who considered the grain relationships 
to be most profitable developed their relationships only direct with the buyers. They sold an 
average of about 96% of their products and had an average incremental revenue of 1%. The table 
also shows that fruit, root crop, and tree nut farmers developed their relationships in three ways, 
direct with the buyer; through farmer-based organizations and agents. Tree nut farmers regardless 
of how they developed their relationships sold an average of 100% of their products and the 
average incremental revenues were no different. Regarding the fruit farmers, most of them 
developed direct relationships with buyers however, those who used agents had a higher 
incremental revenue of 45% which is statistically significant at 1%.  The incremental revenues of 
those who used farmer-based organizations were no different from those using either of the two. 
Finally, the root crop enterprise shows that farmers who developed either a direct relationship with 
the buyer or through farmer-based organizations had an equal average incremental revenue which 
was significantly higher than the incremental revenue of 0% from using agents. Using agents yields 
a 100% sale of products but no premium price hence the incremental revenue of 0%.   
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Table 4.17: Incremental Revenue under Farmers Relationship Structure by Crop Category 
Structure by 
Crop 
N Price premium (%) Sale (%) Incremental Revenue (%)  
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Fruits  26 
      
Direct to Buyer 22 36a 40.21 88aA 18.10 34a 39.91 
FBO 4 28 42.72 100a 0.00 28 42.72 
Agent 2 45a 63.64 100A 0.00 45a 63.64 
Grains 27 
      
Direct to Buyer 26 1 4.05 96 10.37 1 4.05 
Roots 32 
      
Direct to Buyer 24 30ab 39.16 89bB 23.36 28a 37.15 
FBO 8 28 32.22 100b 0.00 28b 32.22 
Agent 1 0ab 
 
100B 0.00 0ab 
 
Tree nuts 75 
      
Direct to Buyer 42 8 15.11 100 0.00 8 15.11 
FBO 29 9 17.68 100 0.00 9 17.68 
Agent 6 7 8.16 100 0.00 7 8.16 
Note.  A and a represents the 1% significance level and  B and b represents  5% significance of the 
differences. 
Table 4.18 presents the incremental revenues for the dominant crop in each crop category. 
The table shows that maize and cocoa enterprises depict the result in the grain and tree nut 
categories respectively. Maize farmers developed only direct relationships with buyers and had an 
incremental revenue of 1%. Mango farmers developed relationships directly with buyers, through 
farmer-based organizations, and agents. Farmers who develop relationships through agents had an 
incremental revenue of 45% which was significantly higher than 40% received by farmers with 
direct relationships at the 1% level. However, 45% and 40% incremental revenues are no different 
from the 28% received by farmers who develop relationships through FBOs. Cassava farmers also 
develop their relationships using all the three methods: direct with the buyer, through farmer-based 
organizations and agents. The result indicates that cassava farmers who develop direct 
relationships with the buyers have the highest average incremental revenue of 35% which is 
significant at 1% and 5% with Agents and farmer-based organizations respectively. However, in 
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the root crop category where cassava belongs, Table 4.17, the average incremental revenues of 
direct relationships with buyers and relationships through farmer-based organizations are equal. 
Finally, cocoa farmers developed their relationships directly with buyers, through farmer-based 
organizations, and through agents however, the incremental revenue accrued from using either one 
of the methods is no different statistically. 
Table 4.18: Incremental Revenue under Farmers Relationships Structure by Major 
Specific Crops 
Structure by 
Crop 
N Price premium (%) Sale (%) Incremental Revenue (%)  
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Mango 14 
      
Direct to Buyer 10 42b 26.73 96 9.56 40a 43.42 
FBO 4 28b 36.01 100 0.00 28 42.72 
Agent 2 45 40.25 100 0.00 45a 63.64 
Maize 19 
      
Direct to Buyer 18 1 3.20 99 2.86 1 4.71 
Cassava 27 
      
Direct to Buyer 19 38a 29.71 86bB 25.58 35ba 38.90 
FBO 7 32b 30.83 100b 0.00 32b 32.53 
Agent 1 0ab 0.00 100B 
 
0a 
 
Cocoa 71 
      
Direct to Buyer 40 9 11.85 100 0.00 9 15.37 
FBO 27 10 17.45 100 0.00 10 18.15 
Agent 4 10 7.87 100 0.00 10 8.16 
Note.  A and a represents the 1% significance level and  B and b represents  5% significance of the 
differences. 
 Table 4.19 summarizes the method of farmers' relationship development that yields the 
highest incremental revenue by crop. Mango farmers who develop relationships with buyers 
through farmer-based organizations or agents yield an average incremental revenue that at least as 
high as developing direct relationships.  Direct relationships with buyers yield the highest average 
incremental revenue for maize and cassava farmers. However, with cocoa farmers, the average 
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incremental revenue from either direct relationships or through farmer-based organizations is no 
different. 
Table 4.19: Summary of the hierarchy of farmers relationship development in terms of 
incremental revenue 
 Direct to Buyer Farmer based organization Agent 
Mango  X X 
Maize X   
Cassava X   
Cocoa X X X 
Table 4.20 presents the percentage incremental revenue resulting from the focus of farmers' 
relationships with their buyers. That is the specification-based typology of farmers' relationships. 
The table shows seven possible specifications of the farmers' relationships with their buyers: price 
only; quality only; quantity only; and combinations of these, price-quality; price-quantity; quality-
quantity; price-quality-quantity.  
 Four specifications showed up among farmers in the fruit enterprises, quality; price-quality, 
quality-quantity, and price-quality-quantity with respective average incremental revenues of 10%, 
61%, 3%, and 30%. The average incremental revenue of the price-quality specification is 
significantly higher at the 1% level for quality only and quality-quantity focus but the 5% level for 
the price-quality-quantity focus. The 30% average incremental revenue of the price-quality-
quantity focus is significantly higher than the quality-quantity focus at the 5% level but no different 
from the quality only specification. This indicates that fruit farmers are better off in terms of 
incremental revenues when they have price-quality specifications in their relationships. 
Grain enterprise identifies farmers under five focus areas in their relationships with buyers: 
price only; quality only, quantity only; price-quality; and price-quality-quantity with respective 
average incremental revenues of 1%, 0%, 0%, 0%, and 2%. These are not significantly different. 
This indicates that focusing the relationships in the grain enterprise on some specification does not 
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pay off in terms of incremental revenue. However, the farmers have the guarantee of selling 100% 
of their products except those with the trio combination of price-quality-quantity who sell 98% 
which is significantly lower at the 5% level. 
 Concerning the root crop enterprises, the table shows that all the seven focus areas are 
represented in the farmers' relationships with buyers: price only; quality only; quantity only; price-
quality; price-quantity; quality-quantity; and price-quality-quantity with respective average 
incremental revenues of 18%, 0%, 0%, 52%, 21%, 0%, and 9%. The price-quality specification 
which has an average incremental revenue of 52% is the highest and significantly different from 
the quality only, quantity only and quality-quantity specifications at 1%. It is also different from 
the price only, price-quantity and the price-quality-quantity specifications at 10%. The next higher 
option is price-quantity specification with the 21% average incremental revenue which is 
significantly higher than those specifications with zero incremental revenue at the 10% level. The 
specifications with the 18% and 9% average incremental revenue are statistically no different from 
the specifications with zero incremental revenue. Therefore, for root crop enterprises farmers have 
better payoff with the price-quality and price-quantity specifications in their relationships with 
buyers.  
 Farmers in the tree nut enterprises are identified under five focus areas in their 
relationships: price only; quality only; price-quality; price-quantity; and quality-quantity with 
respective average incremental revenues of 6%, 7%, 70%,0%, and 4%. The average incremental 
revenue of 70% is the highest and significantly different from the other specifications at 5%. The 
next higher option which is the quality only specification with average incremental revenue of 7% 
is no different from those specifications with average incremental revenue of 6% and 4% but 
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significantly different from zero at the 5% level. Therefore price-quality specifications give tree 
nut farmers the highest payoff followed by the quantity only specification. 
Table 4.20: Incremental revenue under farmers relationship specification by crop category 
Specification by crop 
category 
N 
Price premium 
(%) 
Sale (%) 
Incremental 
Revenue (%) 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Fruits  26 
      
Quality 2 10a 14.14 100bβ 0.00 10a 14.14 
Price-quality 10 64aAc 40.97 83bB 23.59 61aAc 43.96 
Quality-quantity 4 3Ab 5.00 100Bθ 0.00 3Ab 5.00 
Price-quality-quantity 10 33bc 37.13 91βθ 11.89 30cb 34.90 
Grains 27  
     
Price 7 1 2.27 90 19.15 1 2.27 
Quality 3 0 0.00 100b 0.00 0 0.00 
Quantity 1 0 
 
100B 
 
0 
 
Price-quality 4 0 0.00 100β 0.00 0 0.00 
Price-quality-quantity 11 2 6.03 98bBβ 4.19 2 6.03 
Roots 26 
      
Price 3 18c 27.54 100C 0.00 18c 27.54 
Quality 1 0CℓA 
 
100c 
 
0A𝜂 
 
Quantity 2 0aτ 0.00 100ℓ 0.00 0 aτ 0.00 
Price-quality 13 56cCabBα 43.32 84τ𝜂 30.15 52CcaAα 42.44 
Price-quantity 4 21ℓbτ 23.23 100τ 0.00 21Cℓτ𝜂 23.23 
Quality-quantity 1 0B 
 
100𝜂 
 
0αℓ 
 
Price-quality-quantity 8 10Aα 7.56 93Ccℓτ𝜂 10.67 9aAα 7.63 
Tree nuts 75 
   
  
 
Price 10 6b 0.00 100 0.00 6b 0.00 
Quality 53 7Ba 4.39 100 0.00 7Ba 4.39 
Price-quality 3 70bBβθ 51.96 100 0.00 70bBβθ 51.96 
Price-quantity 1 0aβθ 
 
100 
 
0aθβ 
 
Quality-quantity 7 4θ 4.82 100 0.00 4β 4.82 
Note. b, B, β,θ, represents the 5% significance level and C, c, ℓ, τ, 𝜂, represents the 10% significance 
level and a, A, α represents 1% significance levels 
 The incremental revenues resulting from the focus areas of farmers' relationships are 
presented for the dominant crop in each crop category in Table 4.21. Mango from the fruit 
category, maize from the grain category, cassava from the root crop category, and cocoa from the 
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tree nut category are presented. The results show that mango farmers have the same four focus 
areas in their relationships as in the general fruit category. The price-quality specification has an 
average incremental revenue of 93% (61% in fruit category) which is significantly higher at the 
1% level compared with the average incremental revenues of other specifications used by mango 
farmers . This indicates that the price-quality focused relationships yields a better payoff for mango 
farmers, which is in alignment with what was found for the general fruit. 
 Maize farmers are identified under four kinds of specifications in their relationships but the 
general grain category where maize belongs has five specifications. However, just as the grain 
category, the payoffs are no different regardless of the specifications the maize farmers use. The 
average incremental revenues are about 0% but they have the guarantee of selling 100% of their 
maize. 
 The table also shows that cassava farmers focus their relationships on four areas: price 
only; price-quality; price-quantity; and price-quality-quantity, the price component being 
consistent. These specifications have average incremental revenues of 25%, 52%, 21%, and 9%. 
The price-quality specification which has an incremental revenue of 52% is significantly higher 
than the price-quantity and price-quality-quantity specifications at the 10% and 1% significance 
levels respectively. However, it is not significantly different from the price only specification 
which has an average incremental revenue of 25%. The root crop category where cassava belongs 
exhibits seven categories but cassava farmers have four with price inclusive in each of them. 
 Finally, cocoa farmers are identified to focus their relationships on four specifications: 
price only; quality only; price-quality; and quality-quantity with respective average incremental 
revenues of 6%, 7%, 70%, and 5%. Regardless of the specifications that the cocoa formers had, 
they were all able to sell 100% of their cocoa. This is attributable to cocoa being an important crop 
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for its export value. The price-quality relationship with 70% average incremental revenue is 
significantly higher than at the 5% level but no different from the price only specification that has 
the 6% average incremental revenue. This indicates that the price-quality and price only 
specifications in cocoa farmers' relationships gives a higher payoff. 
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Table 4.21: Incremental Revenue of Farmers Relationship Specification by Major Crop 
Specification by major crop N 
Price premium 
(%) 
Sale 
(%) 
Incremental Revenue 
(%) 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Mango 14 
      
Quality 2 10 a 14.14 100C 0.00 10ac 14.14 
Price-quality 4 93 aAα 2.89 100c 0.00 93aAα 2.89 
Quality-quantity 2 5 A 7.07 100ℓ 0.00 5Ab 7.07 
Price-quality-quantity 9 37 α 42.74 93 ℓcC 9.68 40αcb 33.97 
Maize 19       
Quality 3 0 0.00 100 0.00 0 0.00 
Quantity 1 0  100  0  
Price-quality 4 0 0.00 100 0.00 0 0.00 
Price-quality-quantity 10 2 6.32 98 3.63 2 6.32 
Cassava 27       
Price 2 25 35.36 100Cc 0.00 25 35.36 
Price-quality 13 56 ba 43.32 84Cℓ 30.15 52ac 42.44 
Price-quantity 4 21 b 23.23 100ℓτ 0.00 21c 23.23 
Price-quality-quantity 8 10 a 7.56 93cτ 10.67 9a 7.63 
Cocoa 71       
Price 10 6 β 0.00 100 0.00 6β 0.00 
Quality 52 7 b 4.32 100 0.00 7b 4.32 
Price-quality 3 70 bB 51.96 100 0.00 70bB 51.96 
Quality-quantity 5 5 Bβ 5.02 100 0.00 5Bβ 5.02 
Note. b, B, β,θ, represents the 5% significance level and C, c, ℓ, τ, 𝜂, represents the 10% significance level and a, A, α represents 1% 
significance levels 
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The summary of the hierarchy of farmers relationship specification in Table 4.22 shows that in 
terms of incremental revenue, mango farmers are better off focusing their relationships on price-
quality specifications or price-quality-quantity specifications. Cassava and cocoa farmers are 
better off with a price-quality or price only specification in their relationships with buyers. Maize 
farmers, however, would have the same average incremental revenue regardless of the focus of 
their relationships. Generally, farmers would do well with a price-quality focus in their 
relationships 
Table 4.22: Summary of the hierarchy of farmers relationship specifications in terms of 
incremental revenue 
 Price Quality Quantity Price-
quality 
Price-
quantity 
Quality-
quantity 
Price-quality-
quantity 
Mango    X    
Maize  X X X   X 
Cassava X   X    
Cocoa X   X    
The incremental revenue that accrues from how the relationships between the farmers and 
the buyers are governed i.e. the governance-based typology of relationships is presented in Table 
4.23. The governance mechanisms are shown as formal and informal agreements. Where formal 
agreements are legally enforceable and characterized by a low trust but informal agreements are 
not legally enforceable but characterized by high trust. 
 The results show that fruit, grains, root crops, and tree nut farmers use both formal and 
informal agreements to govern their relationships. Fruit farmers who use formal agreements have 
an average incremental revenue of 37% and those who use informal agreements have an average 
incremental revenue of 35% however they are not statistically different. Grain farmers regardless 
of whether they use formal or informal agreements have about 0% average incremental revenue 
however they can sell 98% and 96%  of their grains respectively. 
The table also shows that farmers in the root enterprise who use formal agreements to 
govern their relationships had an average incremental revenue of 67% while those who used 
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informal agreements had 13% which is significantly lower at the 1% level. This indicates that root 
crop farmers are better off using formal agreements to govern their relationships. 
 Regarding the tree nut enterprises, the average incremental revenue of farmers who used 
formal agreement is no different from farmers who used informal agreements in their relationships 
with buyers. This implies that the governance mechanism does not matter in terms of incremental 
revenues for farmers. Finally, farmers in the vegetable enterprise used only informal agreements. 
Table 4.23: Incremental Revenue under Farmers Relationship Governance by Crop 
Category 
Governance N Price premium (%) Sale (%) Incremental Revenue (%) 
by crop category Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Fruits  26 
      
Formal 20 38 39.95 90 18.17 37 40.50 
Informal 6 38 46.65 88 14.72 35 44.21 
Grains 26 
      
Formal 7 0 0.00 98 4.20 0 0.00 
Informal 19 1 4.72 96 12.13 1 4.72 
Roots 32 
      
Formal 9 72*** 35.53 94 16.67 67*** 35.19 
Informal 23 13*** 21.56 91 22.33 13*** 21.59 
Tree nuts 75 
      
Formal 10 16 29.49 100 0.00 16 29.49 
Informal 64 8 12.52 100 0.00 8 12.52 
Note. *** represents 10% significance level 
 The incremental revenue from how farmers govern their relationships with buyers is also 
presented for specific crops, Table 4.24, which is the dominant crop in each crop category. Mango 
farmers who use formal agreements in their relationships have an average incremental revenue of 
45% and those who use informal agreements have 45%. The difference is however not significant 
indicating that the governance mechanism does not matter in terms of incremental revenue for 
mango farmers. Similarly, the average incremental revenue of maize and cassava farmers use 
either formal and informal agreements to govern their relationships is not different. However, 
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regarding cassava farmers, those who govern their relationships through formal agreements have 
an average incremental revenue of 67% compared to 16% for those who use informal agreements. 
This difference is significant at the 1% level and indicates that cassava farmers are better off using 
formal agreements to govern their relationships. 
Table 4.24: Incremental Revenue under Farmers Relationship Governance by Major Crop 
Governance N Price premium (%) Sale (%) Incremental Revenue (%) 
by major crop 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Mango 14 
      
Formal 10 43 41.31 96 8.45 44 36.88 
Informal 4 48 55.00 98 5.00 45 51.96 
Maize 18 
      
Formal 7 0 0.00 98 4.20 0 0.00 
Informal 11 2 6.03 100 0.60 2 6.03 
Cassava 27 
      
Formal 9 72*** 35.53 94 16.67 67*** 35.19 
Informal 18 17*** 23.33 88 24.74 16*** 23.48 
Cocoa 70 
      
Formal 10 16 29.49 100 0.00 16 29.49 
Informal 60 8 12.77 100 0.00 8 12.77 
Note. *** represents 1% significance level 
 The summary of the hierarchy of farmers' relationship governance in terms of incremental 
revenue is presented in Table 4.25. It shows the incremental revenues for mango, maize, and cocoa 
are not different under formal or informal agreements governance. Cassava farmers, however, are 
better off using formal agreements to govern their relationships. 
Table 4.25: Summary of the hierarchy of farmers relationship governance in terms of 
incremental revenue 
Crop Formal agreements Informal agreements 
Mango X X 
Maize X X 
Cassava X  
Cocoa X X 
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Chapter 5 Summary, conclusion, policy recommendations 
 5.1. Summary 
This study sought to address the problem that inter-organizational relationships may not be 
valued by all farmers and the types may differ for those who value it. The motivation was that 
farmers are faced with the decision of how to sell their farm products. The farmer could sell in the 
spot market after production or develop some kind of relationship with potential buyers and sell to 
them when they harvest. Interests in inter-organizational relationships have been stimulated in 
Ghana in recent years by policies seeking to reduce farmers' market risks while improving 
processors' access to agricultural products meeting desired quality and availability (MoFA, 2007, 
2017). This is premised on the belief that spot markets do not favor farmers because of information 
asymmetry and small landholding (4ha) compared to processors and other buyers who demand 
output from several hundred hectares. The participatory nature of developing a relationship is 
thought to overcome some of the challenges that farmers face using spot markets (Wagner, 2015). 
However, the coexistence of both spot markets and farmer-buyer relationships presuppose that 
farmers must be having some gains in each case. 
The research question, therefore, was this: what factors motivate farmers who participate 
in inter-organizational relationships and to what is the hierarchy of the relationships based on 
incremental revenue? The answer to the research question, therefore, provides insights into 
policies that may be implemented to support farmers’ ability to fully exploit these inter-
organizational relationships to achieve their economic objectives. The main objective of the study 
was to find out what factors motivate farmers who participate in inter-organizational relationships 
and what is the hierarchy in terms of incremental revenue. Three specific objectives were 
addressed to achieve the main objective. (1) To identify and classify the typologies of inter-
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organizational relationships in which farmers participate to sell their farm products in Ghana, (2) 
to estimate and compare the net benefits associated with the farmers’ participation in relationships 
with buyers in Ghana and (3) to estimate the hierarchy of the typologies of relationships in terms 
of incremental revenue in Ghana. 
The transaction cost and human action theories were recruited to provide an understanding 
of the factors that motivate farmers to participate in relationships with the buyers of their farm 
produce. By the transaction cost theory of the firm (Williamson, 1975; 1985a), it was argued that 
the value perceived by firms involved in an inter-organizational relationship is greater than the 
value of not participating. In the same token, those with the option to participate and choose not to 
participate may be perceiving the value emanating from their participation to be lower than their 
participation costs. This is not contradicted by the human action theory (Von Mises, 1966) which 
allows an assertion that the decision of a farmer to participate in relationships with buyers of their 
farm produce is purposeful behavior that is based on rational considerations. The study, therefore, 
hypothesized that reducing transaction costs increases the likelihood of farmers participating in 
relationships with buyers. It was also hypothesized that farmers are likely to participate in 
relationships based on the perishability of the crop they produced. Data on farmers' socioeconomic 
characteristics, crop enterprises, and transaction costs were collected from 354 farmers in Ghana. 
The binary logit regression, multinomial logit regression, t-tests, charts, and percentages were used 
to analyze the data and present the results. 
The results of the study showed that 55% of farmers sell their farm products through the 
spot market compared to 45% who sell theirs by developing relationships with their buyers.  The 
typologies of the farmers' relationships were determined based on how farmers develop their 
relationships, the focus areas of their relationships and the mechanisms used to govern them.  
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It was found that about 68% of the participating farmers developed direct relationships 
with buyers, 22% developed their relationships through FBOs and 6% developed their 
relationships using other methods (agents and combinations of agents, FBOs, and direct 
relationships). The study also revealed that farmers who used FBOs were on average older farmers, 
farmers with smaller farms, and farmers in the tree nut and root crop enterprises compared with 
farmers with direct relationships. On the other hand, farmers who developed a direct relationship 
with buyers were on average more educated and had higher incomes both farm and off-farm. The 
characteristics of farmers who used agents were not significantly different from farmers who used 
FBOs and direct relationships except in incomes. 
The study also found that farmers focused their relationships on price, quality, quantity or 
their combinations. The majority of the participating farmers, 83%  had a quality focus, 57% had 
a price focus and 32% had a quantity focus. That the percentages do not add up to 100% indicates 
that some of the farmers' relationships had more than one focus. Farmers who focused on the 
combinations price-quality-quantity and price-quality specifications had the highest average 
incomes. Also, farmers with the lowest incomes, both farm and off-farm preferred quantity only 
or price-quantity specifications in their relationships with their buyers. For fruit farmers, 
specifications that had only one focus were not a preference compared with those that had some 
combination except the price-quantity specification. One the contrary, tree nut farmers preferred 
relationships which had only one focus area. However, for root crop, vegetable and grain farmers 
the focus area did not matter. 
About 69% of farmers identified their relationships to be governed by informal agreements 
while 31% identified their relationships to be governed by formal agreements. Females tend to 
prefer informal agreements in relationships compared to males. The farmers using formal 
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agreements had higher average off-farm incomes. Farmers with higher average years of education 
and higher averages acres of farmland tend to use formal agreements to govern their relationships. 
Also, fruit farmers preferred formal agreements while grain and tree nut farmers preferred informal 
agreements. However, for root crop and vegetable farmers, the percentage of farmers using formal 
and informal agreements was not statistically different. 
The results of binary logit regression aimed at providing an understanding of the factors that 
motivate farmers' participation show that the fruit enterprise and the factors that reduce transaction 
costs: information availability, sales certainty, and price certainty are significant factors. Farmers' 
characteristics, grain, root crop, and tree nut enterprises were not significant factors. The odds ratio 
of fruit farmers participating in relationships is 4.416 times higher than the odds ratio of non-fruit 
farmers choosing to participate. A unit increase in the information availability increases the odds 
ratio of participating in relationships by 1.48 times more than choosing not to participate. Also, a  
unit increase in sales certainty increases the odds ratio of choosing to participate in relationships 
by 1.91 times more than choosing not to participate. Finally, increasing the farmers' certainty of 
prices increases the odds ratio of participating in relationships by 1.294 times more than choosing 
not to participate. The transaction cost factors confirm the hypothesis that reducing transaction 
costs increases farmers' participation in relationships. The odds ratios of the farmers' 
socioeconomic characteristics were not statistically significant indicating that the factors 
explaining farmers' decision to participate in relationships may not be statistically related to their 
socioeconomic characteristics. 
The fruit enterprise had a positive effect on farmers thus confirming the hypothesis that 
high perishability of crop products increases participation. The grain, root crops, and tree nut 
enterprises were not significant. This indicates producing grains, roots or tree nuts neither increases 
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nor decreases the odds ratio of choosing to participate compared to the farmers who do not produce 
them because they are not perishable. 
The multinomial logit regression to determine how far the farmers' choice of the method 
of developing their relationship is predicted by the same covariates in the binary logit model shows 
some variables to be significant. The regression produced two models: FBOs relative to direct to 
buyer and other methods relative to direct to buyer. The results showed that sales certainty, price 
certainty, age, full-time farming, fruit, and root enterprises were significant in explaining the 
farmers' decision to develop their relationships through FBOs relative to direct to the buyer. A unit 
increase in the certainty of sale and prices of the farmers' product increased the relative risk of 
developing relationships through FBOs relative to direct to the buyer. Likewise, full-time farming, 
fruit, and root crop enterprises increased the farmers' preference for relationships developed 
through FBOs over direct relationships with the buyers. However, a unit increase in age decreased 
the relative risk of farmers preferring relationships developed through FBOs over direct 
relationships with buyers. The results also showed that information availability and price certainty 
were significant in explaining the farmers' decision to develop their relationships through other 
methods relative to directly with the buyer. Other methods include agents and combinations of 
methods. Hence a unit increase in information availability and the farmers' certainty of product 
prices increases the preference for other methods over direct relationships with the buyer.  
The multinomial logit to assess the factors that determined the focus areas of farmers' 
relationships found that increasing the certainty of farmers' product prices, increased the likelihood 
of farmers focusing on quality specification relative to all other possible specifications in the 
relationship. 
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Finally, the study estimated the hierarchy of the typologies of farmers' relationships in 
terms of incremental revenue and based on the farmers' crop enterprises. Four crops, mango, 
maize, cassava and cocoa from the four crop categories fruits, grains, root crops, and tree nut were 
assessed. Regarding incremental revenues based on how farmers developed their relationships, 
Mango farmers who used agents to develop their relationships had an average incremental revenue 
of 45% which was significantly higher at 1% compared with those with direct relationships who 
had 40%. However, the incremental revenue of 45% and 40% were no different from those using 
FBOs who had a 28% average incremental revenue. The outcome of the mango farmers was also 
reflective of the general fruit category. Maize farmers had only direct relationships and average 
incremental revenue of 1%. Also, cassava farmers who developed direct relationships with buyers 
had the highest average incremental revenue of 35% but cocoa farmers' average incremental 
revenue was statistically no different regardless of the method used to develop their relationships. 
Regarding the focus of farmers' relationships, the price-quality and price-quality-quantity focus 
may yield similar but better payoff compared with other specifications for mango farmers, 
however, the general fruit category indicates that the price-quality specification yields the highest 
payoff. With maize, the average incremental revenues are about 0%  for each of the areas that the 
farmers focus but they have the guarantee of selling 100% of their maize. Cassava farmers use 
four kinds of specifications in the relationship with the buyer, the price-quality specification yields 
a higher average incremental revenue of 52% than the other specifications except for the price only 
specification (25%) which was not statistically different. For cocoa farmers, the price-quality and 
price only specifications in their relationships gave a higher payoff. 
 Regarding the average incremental revenues base on the mechanisms that govern farmers' 
relationships, the results showed that for all the crop enterprises the difference in the average 
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incremental revenue of farmers who use formal agreements and informal agreements was not 
statistically significant except for cassava. Cassava farmers who used formal agreements had an 
average incremental revenue of 67% while those who used informal agreements to govern their 
relationships had 16%. 
 
 5.2. Conclusion 
This research sought to contribute to the literature on inter-organizational relationships in 
the agri-food sector. The decision of how to sell farm produce is an economic imperative for the 
farmer. Farmers sell their products through the spot market after the harvest or they may have 
some kind of relationship with an agro-processor, wholesalers or other buyers before production 
to sell to them. Recent agricultural policies in Ghana seeking to reduce farmers' market risks and 
ensure agro-processors access to farm products has sparked interests in farmer-buyer relationships. 
However, the coexistence of spot markets and relationships, by the transaction cost and human 
action theories, indicates that farmers must be having some gains with the choice they make. 
Hence, such relationships may not be valued by every farmer and the types may differ for those 
who value it. The main objective of this research was to provide an understanding of the factors 
the motivate farmers to participate in inter-organizational relationships and the hierarchy of the 
relationships in terms of incremental revenue in Ghana. An understanding of the farmers' gains 
from such relationships would enable policymakers to better help farmers to achieve their 
economic objectives while minimizing the challenges they present. 
The specific objectives were to identify the typologies of the relationships that exist 
between farmers and buyers in Ghana; to estimate the factors motivating farmers participation, 
and to rank the typologies in terms of incremental revenue. To achieve these objectives data on 
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farmers' characteristics, transaction costs and crop enterprises were collected from crop farmers in 
Ghana. 
The study’s results indicate that close to half of the farmers participate in some relationship 
with buyers to sell their farm products and the others sell their products in the spot market. The 
majority of the participating farmers developed their relationships directly with the buyers, 
followed by those who use farmer-based organizations and a few farmers who use agents and some 
combination of methods. Also, most of the farmers' relationships are focused on the quality 
specifications of the product. This is followed by the farmers whose relationships are focused on 
the combination price-quality-quantity and the price-quality combination. Relationships with a 
quantity only focus was the least patronized by farmers. About two-thirds of the farmers' 
relationships are governed by informal agreements and the other third are governed by formal 
agreements. 
The binary logit regression used to analyze the factors that motivate farmers to participate in 
relationships indicates that as hypothesized reducing transaction costs indeed increases the odds 
of farmers choosing to participate compared to choosing not to participate. It shows that increasing 
the variables information availability, price certainty and sales certainty increases the odds of 
farmers choosing to participate compared to choosing not to participate. However, the odds ratio 
of the socioeconomic characteristics was not statistically significant indicating that the factors 
explaining farmers' decision to participate in relationships may not be statistically related to their 
socioeconomic characteristics. The fruit enterprise increased the odds of farmers choosing to 
participate thus confirming the hypothesis that high perishability of crop products increases 
participation. The grains, root crops, and tree nut enterprises were not statistically significant 
which was expected because they are not perishable. 
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The multinomial logit regression to determine how far the farmers' choice of the method of 
developing their relationship is predicted by the same covariates in the binary logit model shows 
some variables to be significant. It showed that sales certainty, price certainty, full-time farming, 
fruit, and root enterprises increased the relative risk of the farmer choosing to develop their 
relationships through FBOs relative to direct to the buyer. Aging, however, decreased the relative 
risk of the farmer choosing to develop their relationships through FBOs relative to direct to the 
buyer. The results also showed that increasing information availability and price certainty 
increased the relative risk of farmers choosing to develop their relationships through other methods 
relative to directly with the buyer. Regarding the explanation for farmers' focus areas in their 
relationships, increasing the certainty of farmers' prices increases the likelihood of farmers 
focusing their relationships on quality relative to all other possible specifications. 
 The hierarchy of the farmers' relationships in terms of incremental revenue indicates that 
mango farmers are better off developing their relationships through agents or FBOs and focusing 
on price-quality or price-quality-quantity specifications. However, whether they choose formal or 
informal agreement would not matter in terms of incremental revenue. Maize farmers are better 
off developing their relationships directly with the buyer however, the choice of the focus area and 
the governance mechanism makes no difference. Cassava farmers are also better off developing 
their relationships directly with the buyer, focusing on price-quality or price only specifications 
and using formal agreements to govern their relationships. Finally, for cocoa farmers, any method 
they use to develop and govern their relationships would not make any difference in terms of 
incremental revenue, however, they are better off focusing their relationship on price-quality or 
price only specifications. 
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 5.3. Policy recommendations 
This study was carried out to provide an understanding of the factors that motivate farmers 
to participate in relationships with buyers and the hierarchy of the typologies of the relationships 
in terms of incremental revenue. Thus it promises insights into policies that may be implemented 
to support farmers’ ability to fully exploit these inter-organizational relationships to achieve their 
economic objectives while minimizing the challenges they present.   
Table 5.1 shows 9 key findings of the study and their respective policy implications. The 
first 4 are the farmers' motivation factors for participating in relationships with buyers and the next 
5 are the hierarchy of farmers' relationships in terms of incremental revenue. The first shows that 
increasing information availability increases the odds of farmers participating in relationships 
suggesting that farmers value unbiased knowledge of product quality, quantities, delivery times 
and location as well as better communication to achieve their economic objectives. Therefore, to 
increase farmers' participation in relationships with potential buyers such as agro-processors, 
wholesalers or aggregators and traders, measures that enhance transparency can be promoted by 
advocates of such relationships. The second key finding is that increasing sales certainty of 
farmers' products increases the odds of farmers participating in relationships. This suggests that 
farmers value a guaranteed sale, avoidance of spoilage resulting from delay of sales, matching 
production to planned sale, reduction in production and every opportunity to sell all products. 
Therefore, to increase farmers' participation in relationships, agricultural policy initiatives should 
be targeted at ascertaining the sale of the farmers' products in the farmer buyer relationship. The 
third key finding is that increasing price certainty increases the odds of farmers participating in 
relationships with buyers. This suggests that farmers value an assured price, price premium, 
knowing price ahead of the sale, opportunity to improve the price when market conditions change, 
97 
and decreased price variability during the season. Hence policy initiatives that ascertain the 
farmers expected prices can promote farmers' participation in relationships. The fourth key finding 
suggests that farmers producing fruit crops increases the odds of participation in relationships, 
therefore, the fruit enterprise can be a big target of policies that promote farmer-buyer 
relationships. 
The next 5 key findings represent the hierarchy of the farmers' relationships in terms of 
incremental revenue. The fifth key finding suggests that mango farmers who develop their 
relationships through farmer-based organizations or agents have a higher average incremental 
revenue. On the contrary, the sixth key finding shows that for maize and cassava farmers, 
developing direct relationships with the buyers yield the highest average incremental revenue. It 
can, therefore, be suggested that policy initiatives and advocates of farmers' relationships should 
target strengthing farmer-based organizations for mango farmers to enhance payoffs from 
relationships with buyers. However, maize and cassava farmers' policy targets should be to 
empower farmers to develop direct relationships with the buyers. The seventh key finding shows 
that mango farmers are better off when they focus their relationships with the buyers on price-
quality or price-quality-quantity specifications. Hence policy initiatives that are targeted at 
enhancing farmers' ability to meet the price, quality and quantity specifications could as well 
enhance their payoffs in the relationship. The eighth key finding suggests that cassava and cocoa 
farmers are better off focusing their relationships on price-quality or price only specifications. 
Policy initiatives to enhance cassava and cocoa farmers' ability to meet price and quality 
specifications of buyers could enhance farmers' incremental revenues. The final key finding shows 
that formal agreements in relationships favor cassava farmers. Formal agreements should be 
promoted in cassava farmers' relationships to enhance their payoffs in the relationships. 
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Table 5.1: Key findings and policy implications 
Key findings Policy implications 
Increasing information availability 
increases the odds of participating 
Promote transparency between farmers and buyers 
in relationships 
Increasing sales certainty increases the 
odds of participating 
Support initiatives that focus on farmers being able 
to sell their crops in relationships 
Increasing price certainty increases the 
odds of participating 
Support initiatives that allow farmers to receive their 
expected prices. 
Fruit enterprise increases the odds of 
participating 
Promote relationships for farmers in the fruit 
enterprise 
Developing relationships through FBOs 
or agents favors mango farmers 
Strengthen mango FBOs to take advantage of 
relationships with buyers 
Developing direct relationships with 
buyers favors maize and cassava 
farmers 
Promote direct relationships with buyers for maize 
and cassava farmers 
Mango farmers are better off focusing 
on price-quality or price-quality-
quantity 
Support initiatives that will enhance mango farmers 
ability to meet price, quality and quantity 
specifications 
Cassava and cocoa farmers are better 
off focusing on price-quality or price 
Support initiatives that will enhance cassava and 
cocoa farmers ability to meet price and quality 
specifications 
Formal agreement in relationships 
favors cassava farmers 
Support initiatives for cassava farmers to use formal 
agreements in their relationships 
 
 
 5.4. Limitations for Further Research 
The developments in this research present some lessons that could be addressed for further 
research. The main lesson is related to the granularity of the data because of the number of different 
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crop enterprises. To strengthen the findings of the incremental revenues which were analyzed at 
the crop level, it would be beneficial to have a dataset that has a larger sample of farmers in the 
different crop enterprises. The motivators for farmers' participation in relationships were estimated 
at the farmer level and the findings indicate that transaction costs increase the probability of 
farmers' participation in relationships. Also producing perishable crops increases the farmers' 
probability of participating in relationships relative to producing durable crops. It would be 
interesting for further research to consider this estimation at the crop level with a larger sample to 
assess if and which transaction cost component affects which crops enterprises of farmers. 
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Appendix A - Types of farmer relationships by crop 
 
Partici
pants 
Structure of relationship Specification of relationship Governance of 
relationship 
Crop # of 
farmer 
 D2B FBO Agent Price Price 
only 
Qual Qual 
only 
Qu
ant 
Quant 
only 
Quant 
& 
qual 
Quant 
& 
price 
Qual 
& 
price 
Quant, 
qual & 
price 
Verba
l 
Wri 
tten 
Con
tract 
Coconut 3 3 0 0 1 0 3 0 3 0 2 0 0 1 0 2 1 
Mangoes 17 12 4 1 13 0 17 2 11 0 2 0 4 9 4 2 11 
Oranges 2 2 0 0 2 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
Papaya 7 7 0 0 7 0 7 0 3 0 0 0 4 3 2 1 4 
Pineapple 5 5 0 0 5 0 5 0 3 0 0 0 2 3 1 0 4 
Beans 2 2 0 0 2 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 
Groundnut 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 8 
Maize 19 19 0 0 7 0 18 6 12 1 5 0 1 6 11 0 2 
Oil palm 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Rice 9 9 0 0 9 7 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 7 0 0 
Cassava 33 25 7 1 32 3 24 0 17 1 0 5 13 11 24 7 2 
Cocoyam 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Plantain 8 8 0 0 4 1 4 1 5 2 1 1 1 1 7 0 1 
Yam 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Cashew 4 2 0 2 1 0 3 2 2 0 1 1 0 0 4 0 0 
Cocoa 72 40 28 4 14 10 62 53 5 0 5 0 4 0 61 3 8 
Okra 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Onion 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
Peppers 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Tomatoes 2 2 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 
Total 190 143 39 8 103 23 154 67 68 4 16 9 32 39 131 15 44 
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Appendix B - Summarized specifications of farmers relationships 
Farmers' Characteristics 
Quantity-Based Quality-Based Price-Based 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Farm income (GHS/m) 9,854.60 36,028.46 4,859.61 23145.86 6,622.81 27,738.11 
Off-farm inc (GHS/m) 4,251.17 4,345.30 2,701.75 3279.86 3,367.29 3,713.02 
Farm experience (Yrs) 18.65 9.44 21.49 10.64 20.31 10.92 
Education (yrs) 10.81 4.99 10.30 4.50 10.92 5.16 
Age (yrs) 47.83 12.97 50.74 11.66 49.15 13.21 
Gender (1=Male) 0.87 0.34 0.77 0.42 0.82 0.38 
farm size (acres) 83.48 241.86 46.45 156.94 59.92 187.24 
Single crop(1=Yes) 0.38 0.49 0.39 0.49 0.41 0.49 
Fruits (1=Yes) 0.42 0.50 0.29 0.45 0.36 0.48 
Roots (1=Yes) 0.54 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.48A 0.50 
Grains (1=Yes) 0.58 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.55 0.50 
Nuts (1=Yes) 0.27 0.45 0.54 0.50 0.33 0.47 
Vegetables (1=Yes) 0.13 0.34 0.11 0.31 0.16 0.37 
N 52  132  91  
 
